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Report at a glance
Copyright can strengthen the incentive to 
create by affording rights holders exclusive 
rights to exploit their work. This can bring into 
existence work that would not otherwise exist, 
)#&#1+0(&)$#./&/?(.$D#&#%0*4$$
E$./&0#&0$/-&#13*$#C.=2*(,#$1()"0*$+1#$*2DF#.0$
to limitations and exceptions. These mediate 
the respective rights of the myriad participants 
in the copyright eco-system, where intellectual 
property (IP) outputs are, to an increasing 
extent, developed from IP inputs, where 
creators are also users, users are creators 
and copyright material cannot be distributed 
digitally without copies being made. 
Limitations and exceptions determine  
questions like: 
! How much may be quoted from a 
copyrighted work before permission must  
be sought?
! In what circumstances can someone who 
has a legitimate copyrighted work change 
the format in which it has been supplied, or 
the time and place at which they use it?
! Where an intermediary makes a digital 
copy of a copyrighted work to assist in 
disseminating it to legitimate users, in 
what, if any, circumstances must they 
obtain explicit permission? 
A companion report, Exceptional Industries, 
reveals the economic contribution to Australia 
and other countries made by industries relying 
on such limitations and exceptions to copyright. 
In Australia in 2010 this includes: 
!$ G/&01(D20(&)$6HI$/;$E2*01+=(+3*$+&&2+=$J1/**$
Domestic Product (GDP), or $182 billion;
! Employing 21% of our paid workforce, 
almost 2.4 million people;
! Paying wages and salaries of $116 billion.
Evidently even if limitations and exceptions 
?+'#$F2*0$+$*?+==$'(;;#1#&.#$0/$0"#$#;%.(#&.8$/;$
these industries or to the value they generate 
for others, better-crafted limitations and 
9.:#;(1&#3&4-5,&#&4'&6*-(.)#'(2,:#;9<&#
a substantial contribution to Australia’s 
economic growth and innovation. 
Currently Australian law provides exceptions 
0/$./>81()"0$=(?(0#'$0/$,#18$*>#.(%.+==8$'#%&#'$
#C.#>0(/&*$;/1$<;+(1$'#+=(&)3$=#)(*=+0#'$(&0/$0"#$
G/>81()"0$E.04$K8$./&01+*0L$/0"#1$F21(*'(.0(/&*$
*2."$+*$0"#$M&(0#'$N0+0#*$+&'$N(&)+>/1#$#&F/8$
#C.#>0(/&*$0"+0$+1#$?/1#$B#C(D=#$D20$-"(."$+1#$
&#,#10"#=#**$*2DF#.0$0/$.+1#;2=$0#*0*$0/$#&*21#$
that they do not undermine the ability of rights 
holders to exploit their work. 
Because they can only be used where such 
tests can be met, provided they are properly 
crafted, 3&4-5,&#&4'&6*-(.)#)%(2,:#%90&#
negligible downsides for rights holders. On 
the other hand they will assist in the distribution 
of copyrighted works – which will improve the 
market for such works. And they will permit new 
and innovative uses that could not be anticipated 
by legislators before the event. 
3 
E
xcepting the F
uture
O/1$(&*0+&.#$-"#&$(0$-+*$%1*0$(&01/'2.#'L$
E>>=#3*$(7/'$1#=(#'$/&$0"#$2*#13*$+D(=(08$0/$
format shift copyrighted content that had been 
legitimately obtained. This right was unclear 
under Australian exceptions but permitted 
D8$0"#$?/1#$B#C(D=#$#C.#>0(/&*$(&$0"#$MN4$:&$
addition, in substantial part because of our more 
constrained limitations and exceptions,  
it took ten years for TiVo to make it to Australia 
and then with a more limited feature list than 
was provided in the US. 
:&$+''(0(/&$0/$0"#*#$(&+'#P2+.(#*$(&$E2*01+=(+3*$
#C.#>0(/&*$1#)(?#L$E2*01+=(+3*$#C(*0(&)$*+;#$
harbour rules provide inadequate protection 
for many internet intermediaries seeking to 
distribute legitimate copyright material to 
legitimate users. This raises risks and inhibits 
investment in internet intermediary services.  
A study of the perceptions of early stage angel 
and venture capital investors in the US and 
Europe found that their investment decisions 
are affected by copyright-related risk. These 
early stage investors put a risk premium 
on internet intermediary investments to the 
Australian equivalent of around $2 billion a 
=&91#>%&.#+9'&:#>-*%#-.3&4-5,&#&4'&6*-(.)#
and limited safe harbour provisions. 
O210"#1L$0"#$(&0#1&#0$(*$+$<)#&#1+=$>21>/*#3$
or infrastructural technology like the internal 
combustion engine or electricity and is 
+../1'(&)=8$(&0#)1+=$0/$(0*$2*#1*3$>1/'2.0(,(08$
growth. We have simulated a scenario in which, 
+*$+$1#*2=0$/;$(&01/'2.(&)$B#C(D=#$#C.#>0(/&*L$
1#+=$)1/-0"$(*$F2*0$/&#Q"2&'1#'0"$"()"#1$
than it was from 2007 through 2010 for those 
(&'2*01(#*$-#$"+,#$('#&0(%#'$+*$1#=8(&)$/&$
limitations and exceptions to copyright. This 
increases aggregate annual industry value 
added through time so that after ten years the 
additional annual value added or welfare 
gain to the Australian economy would be 
$593 million. 
The familiar, and many less familiar names of 
internet intermediary services, such as Akamai, 
eBay, Facebook, YouTube etc. show that they 
.+&$?+R#$+$?+F/1$./&01(D20(/&$0/$0"#$#./&/?84$
And yet, in Australia, all these businesses are 
exposed to risk of copyright violations. With 
(&+'#P2+0#$+&'$(&B#C(D=#$./>81()"0$#C.#>0(/&*L$
and with safe harbour protections extending 
only to carriage providers and not internet 
intermediaries, there is substantially more risk 
to such services in Australia than in the US and 
in comparable countries like Singapore. 
?-0&.#*%-)@#-*#-)#%91:#*(#/9-.)9=#*%&#5&.&8*)#
of Excepting the Future.
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Executive summary
The internet is bringing 
pervasive change and with it 
new opportunities 
Established almost exactly 300 years ago, 
the legal architecture of copyright presumes 
clear distinctions between creating and using 
a work and between handling and copying a 
work. Investing in physical assets like trucks 
and buildings to transport, house and market 
physical copyrighted goods like books and 
magazines has never attracted the application of 
copyright law. By contrast digital content cannot 
be handled without copying it. Thus in the digital 
world, the distinction between handling 
and copying a work has completely broken 
down. All handling of digital content, however 
helpful to society or rights holders, may prima 
facie be a breach of copyright, attracting liability 
to rights holders if they have not permitted it.
This situation is dysfunctional. It is not 
unlike the state of air-space law at the point 
at which the development of aviation had 
rendered it obsolete. In the early twentieth 
century, following Roman Law, land owners  
held exclusive rights “up to Heaven and down to 
Hell” giving them impracticable veto powers over 
air routes. 
Economic decision makers can usually ‘muddle 
0"1/2)"3$0"#$'8*;2&.0(/&$0/$.+>021#$?/*0$/;$0"#$
available economic gains. However this can limit 
local investment because many services can be 
>1/,('#'$;1/?$/;;*"/1#$F21(*'(.0(/&*$0"+0$#C>/*#$
internet intermediaries to less copyright risk. 
E2*01+=(+$&##'*$+$B#C(D=#$./>81()"0$#C.#>0(/&$
capable of permitting unanticipated innovations 
that are fair to rights holders, as well as an 
extension of safe harbour provisions to all 
intermediaries. 
The value of intermediary 
activities
The activities of internet intermediaries 
(e.g. caching, hosting and indexing) are 
the backbone of the internet. Facilitating 
and enabling such intermediary activities 
is clearly worthwhile and we should do so 
wherever possible, particularly when there 
are negligible costs to others and potentially 
)-/.-8'9.*#>-:&1#5&.&8*)"
The value of the internet for users is at least 
equal to the value they would put on the 
time they spend using it. Combining our own 
1#*#+1."$-(0"$0"+0$/;$/0"#1*L$0"(*$<2*#$,+=2#3$/;$
online activities to household internet users in 
Australia is estimated to be around $60 billion 
+$8#+14$:&0#1&#0$(&0#1?#'(+18$*#1,(.#*$+1#$?+F/1$
contributors to that value:
! Search, navigation and portals are estimated 
to be worth around $12 billion a year to 
Australian households;
! Social networks hosting is estimated to be 
worth around $13 billion a year;
! The increase in the variety of goods and 
services available online is estimated to be 
worth around $16 billion a year; and
!$ S;%.(#&.8$)+(&*$0/$0"#$#./&/?8$+1#$#*0(?+0#'$
to be worth around $8 billion a year.
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A.&+8'-&.'-&)#-.#,-'&.)-./#
create costs to creators, 
innovators and consumers. 
A critical driver of productivity growth from the 
internet has been the way in which collapsing 
transactions costs have enabled all sorts of 
interactions to occur, adding value to content in 
myriad ways, not least by allowing producers 
+&'$=#)(0(?+0#$./&*2?#1*$/;$./&0#&0$0/$%&'$+&'$
access each other. The current state of copyright 
law provides a very unsatisfactory and uncertain 
environment for these connections to be made. 
As Weatherall (2011) noted: 
... due to the nature of digital technology, just 
about any online or digital activity - such as 
reading an eBook or listening to a digital music 
!"#$%$&'()"(#*$+,-&'.$/)0&#*$)1$/)023&.45$
material into digital memory. Owing to the way 
3#03)67/5&)'$&*$6#!'#6$&'$87*53,"&,'$/)023&.45$
law, most of these copies... require permission 
from the copyright owner or an exception. 
94&*$&*$537#$#(#'$:4#3#$#;7&(,"#'5$,/5*$)1<&'#$
(reading a book, listening to music) involve no 
infringement. . . .  Internet intermediaries are 
therefore likely to undertake many actions that 
1,""$:&54&'$54#$3#03)67/5&)'$3&.45$&'$87*53,"&,$=$
and their users will too.
They accordingly require permission from 
copyright owners. To avoid all doubt, they 
would need explicit permission from all rights 
holders involved. But this is quite impracticable. 
For example, if the 170 search engines listed 
at << http://www.philb.com/webse.htm >>  
transacted with all 3.8 million Australian domain 
name registrants, it would involve 645 million 
transactions. If each transaction took 9.5 hours, 
then at average weekly wages the transaction 
costs would exceed $150 billion a year. Yet even 
if this were affordable, it would still fall pitifully 
short of what would be required, for Australian 
users seek search results from the global 
internet (comprising over a trillion web pages), 
&/0$F2*0$E2*01+=(+&$*(0#*4$
In fact internet intermediaries rely largely 
on presuming that rights holders wish 
intermediaries to handle (and thus copy) their 
content, especially since it is standard practice 
for intermediaries to automate the process by 
which rights holders can opt out of the process. 
Yet relying on such an informal process involves 
greater risks for intermediaries under Australian 
./>81()"0$=+-$0"+&$(0$-/2='$-(0"$?/1#$B#C(D=#$
exceptions and broader safe harbour provisions. 
It should not surprise us if companies continue 
to service the Australian market from offshore 
for those activities where it is technically 
possible – such as indexing of sites or hosting 
/;$%=#*$T$0/$+,/('$2&&#.#**+18$=#)+=$2&.#10+(&084
$%&#5&.&8*)#(+#3&4-5,&#
exceptions and extension of 
safe harbour provisions
!"#$MN$'/.01(&#$/;$<;+(1$2*#3$(==2*01+0#*$"/-$+$
B#C(D=#$#C.#>0(/&$-/1R*L$0"/2)"$(0$&##'$&/0$D#$
the only possible model. Under the US system, 
without permission from the rights holder, a use 
(*$<;+(13$"+,(&)$1#)+1'$0/$0"#$;/==/-(&)$.1(0#1(+9
1.  the purpose and character of the use, 
including whether such use is of a 
./??#1.(+=$&+021#$/1$(*$;/1$&/&Q>1/%0$
educational purposes;
2.  the nature of the copyrighted work;
3.  the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole; and
4.  the effect of the use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work.
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U"(=#$0"#1#$+1#$?+&8$>/**(D=#$D#&#%0*$+**/.(+0#'$
-(0"$)1+&0(&)$B#C(D=#$#C.#>0(/&*$+&'$#C0#&'(&)$
safe harbour provisions for internet intermediary 
activities, this study focuses on the three impacts 
itemised in the following subsections. 
Risk and cost of litigation
Flexible exceptions have played a critical role 
(&$>#1?(00(&)$?+F/1$(&&/,+0(/&*$(&$:G!$+&'$/&$
the internet in the US – for instance in the case 
/;$*#+1."$0#."&/=/)8$+&'$E>>=#3*$(7/'4$U"#1#$
parties rely on the exception for new applications 
0"(*$1+(*#*$0"#$*./>#$;/1$<0#*0$.+*#*34$:&$;+.0$0"#$
US case suggests that despite this and despite 
(0*$D1#+'0"L$=(0()+0(/&$2&'#1$<;+(1$2*#3$(*$+.02+==8$
relatively low.
:;$E2*01+=(+$'('$(&01/'2.#$+$B#C(D=#$./>81()"0$
exception, then even if there were a temporary 
increase in litigation as test cases were heard, 
this would be the price of substantial innovation 
downstream and would establish the ground 
rules within which other businesses could have 
increased certainty for their operations as has 
/..211#'$(&$0"#$MN4$O210"#1L$/21$/-&$B#C(D=#$
#C.#>0(/&$?()"0$D/11/-$;1/?$0"#$F21(*>12'#&.#$
of other countries so as to improve the certainty 
with which it could be introduced and reduce the 
need for test cases. 
S,#&$(;$/21$/-&$&+11/-=8$*>#.(%#'$#C.#>0(/&*$
do provide a greater level of legal certainty, this 
D#&#%0$(*$=(R#=8$0/$>+=#$(&0/$(&*()&(%.+&.#$+)+(&*0$
their chilling effect on innovation. In any event, 
0"#1#$(*$*/?#$#,('#&.#$0"+0$'#%&(&)$#C.#>0(/&*$
too narrowly can increase legal uncertainty as 
*0+R#"/='#1*$?2*0$'#0#1?(&#$-"#0"#1$*>#.(%.$
exceptions apply each time technology changes.  
Risk and investment
V(*R$>#1.#>0(/&*$(&B2#&.#$(&,#*0?#&0$'#.(*(/&*L$
particularly in investment by entrepreneurs, angel 
and venture capital (VC) investors. Numerous 
studies suggest strong links between such early 
stage investment, innovation and growth. 
Recent studies explore the impact of changes to 
copyright regulations on early stage investment in 
internet or digital content intermediaries in the US 
and Europe.1 They examine the cost of reducing 
0"#$B#C(D(=(08$/;$#C.#>0(/&*$+&'$*+;#$"+1D/21$
provisions, and increasing uncertainty (i.e. the 
opposite of what is being proposed in this report). 
Their evidence thus includes proxy valuations 
for reducing risk and uncertainty, and extending 
exceptions and safe harbour provisions.
Taking the average of US and European 
angel investor risk perceptions as 
indicative, investors are valuing reduced 
risk and uncertainty as a result of copyright 
limitations and exceptions at around  
$2 billion a year.2 
1 Booz&Co. (2012a) The Impact of US Internet Copyright Regulations on Early-Stage Investment. Available < http://www.booz.com/media/uploads/
BoozCo-Impact-US-Internet-Copyright-Regulations-Early-Stage-Investment.pdf > and Booz&Co. (2012b) The Impact of EU Internet Copyright 
Regulations on Early-Stage Investment. Available < http://www.booz.com/media/uploads/BoozCo-Impact-EU-Internet-Copyright-Regulations-Early-
Stage-Investment.pdf >
2$ W;$./21*#L$1(*R$>#1.#>0(/&*$,+18$+&'$0"#*#$%)21#*$+1#$&/$?/1#$0"+&$*2))#*0(,#$/;$0"#$1(*R$>1#?(2?$0"+0$?()"0$D#$+**/.(+0#'$-(0"$E2*01+=(+3*$(&B#C(D=#$
exceptions, uncertainty and limited safe harbour protection in the minds of early stage investors. Nor do they say anything about the impact of the 
./>81()"0$1#)(?#$/&$=+0#1$*0+)#$(&,#*0?#&0$+&'$0"#$=/.+0(/&+=$'#.(*(/&*$/;$#*0+D=(*"#'$%1?*4
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Productivity: Internet 
infrastructure as ‘general 
purpose’ investment
As von Lohmann argues, the US doctrine of 
<;+(1$2*#3$/>#1+0#*$+*$(&&/,+0(/&$>/=(.8$-(0"(&$
the copyright regime.  It “creates incentives . 
. . to build innovative new products” and this 
“has yielded complementary technologies that 
enhance the value of copyrighted works” – as for 
instance in the case of search technology and 
E>>=#3*$(7/'4$
Considered together the following online 
innovators have a market capitalisation of over 
one trillion US dollars: Akamair, Apple, eBay, 
Facebook, Google, LinkedIn and Yahoo!. Were 
they to operate from Australia, all these 
businesses would be at greater risk of liability 
for copyright violations than they are in 
'(2.*1-&)#>-*%#3&4-5,&#'(6=1-/%*#&4'&6*-(.). 
Although those businesses also provide services 
0/$E2*01+=(+L$/21$=+.R$/;$B#C(D=#$./>81()"0$
exceptions are likely to inhibit investment here 
as many of the services they provide can be 
provided from offshore. Further, although 
E2*01+=(+$"+*$'#%&(0#$*01#&)0"*$(&$0"#$+1#+$/;$
internet technology and innovation,3 our lack of 
B#C(D=#$#C.#>0(/&*$+&'$*+;#$"+1D/21$>1/,(*(/&*$
reduces the chance of such businesses being 
founded and/or growing in Australia. We may 
have missed out in the past, and we will miss 
out on such opportunities in the future.
K#(&)$+$<)#&#1+=$>21>/*#3$0#."&/=/)8$=(R#$0"#$
internal combustion engine or electricity, the 
internet enhances productivity throughout the 
economy. Much of this productivity growth is 
D2(=0$/&$>1/)1#**(,#=8$%&#1$'(,(*(/&*$/;$=+D/214$
This process depends upon the openness of 
the internet and thrives on the reduction of 
latency and of its organisational equivalent 
– transactions costs. Flexible exceptions to 
copyright and adequate safe harbour provisions 
lower transactions costs.
We simulated an increase in productivity growth 
(&$0"#$#C.#>0(/&*$2*(&)$(&'2*01(#*$/;$F2*0$/&#$
one-hundredth of its otherwise experienced 
growth in the three years from 2007 through 
20104 – a very conservative estimate of 
additional growth. This additional growth would 
compound through time so that the increase 
in annual value added or the welfare gain to 
the Australian economy would be $593 million 
higher after ten years. 
?-0&.#*%&)&#5&.&8*)#9.:#*%&#>9=#-.#>%-'%#
9.=#,&/9,#*&)*#:&8.-./#*%&#)'(6&#(+#9#3&4-5,&#
exception would protect rights holders, 
there is every reason to Except the Future
3  < http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-04-19/high-tech-attracts-venture-capital/3959248?section=business >
4$ X/0#$-#$+'/>0$0"#$./&,#&0(/&$"#1#$0"+0$0"#$8#+1$@YYZ$1#;#1*$0/$0"#$%&+&.(+=$8#+1$@YY5QZ$+&'$@Y6Y$0/$@YY[Q6Y$+&'L$-"#1#$/;%.(+=$*0+0(*0(.*$+1#$P2/0#'L$
0"(*$./&,#&0(/&$(*$+'/>0#'$0"1/2)"/20$0"#$1#>/10$#C.#>0$-"#1#$/0"#1-(*#$*>#.(%#'4
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1.Introduction
The internet and related technologies 
are precipitating tremendous change. 
Technological change requires changes to 
institutions, but legal institutions are almost 
always adaptive, rather than radical. This 
may be well and good. We are not blessed 
with the ability to see into the future or all the 
consequences of our actions clearly. However 
the fact that law is adapting gradually means 
that we are a long way from the optimal legal 
framework for copyright on the internet. 
Copyright is almost exactly 300 years old in 
English speaking countries. The Statute of 
Anne dates back to 1710. For the duration 
/;$0"#$<+&+=/)2#$+)#3L$-"(."$=+*0#'$2&0(=$0"#$
late twentieth century, there was a clear 
distinction between creating and using a work 
and between handling, delivering and copying 
a work. These distinctions are now breaking 
down. Users are also producers. Handling 
and delivering anything online, be it content 
or services, generally cannot be done without 
copying and communicating.
As Weatherall (2011) noted: 
... due to the nature of digital technology, 
just about any online or digital activity 
- such as reading an eBook or listening 
5)$,$6&.&5,"$+7*&/$!"#$%$&'()"(#*$+,-&'.$
copies of copyright material into digital 
memory. Owing to the way reproduction is 
6#!'#6$&'$87*53,"&,'$/)023&.45$",:>$+)*5$
of these copies... require permission from 
the copyright owner or an exception. This 
&*$537#$#(#'$:4#3#$#;7&(,"#'5$,/5*$)1<&'#$
(reading a book, listening to music) involve 
no infringement. Thus the reproduction 
right looms large as the ultimate leverage of 
rights holders to control virtually all aspects 
of how [internet intermediaries] run their 
businesses. Internet intermediaries are 
therefore likely to undertake many actions 
that fall within the reproduction right in 
87*53,"&,$=$,'6$54#&3$7*#3*$:&""$5))?1
This situation is similar to the coming of air-
travel to real property law (See Box 1). 
1 Weatherall, K. (2011) @'5#3'#5$@'5#3+#6&,3&#*$,'6$A)023&.45B$8'$87*53,"&,'$8.#'6,$1)3$C#1)3+, Australian Digital Alliance.  
Available < http://www.digital.org.au/our-work/publication/internet-intermediaries-and-copyright-australian-agenda-reform >
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BOX 1:   
NEW TECHNOLOGY AND LEGAL OBSOLESCENCE
Traditionally the right to airspace was governed by the doctrine: Cuius est solum, eius est usque ad 
caelum et ad inferos (“For whoever owns the soil, it is theirs up to Heaven and down to Hell.”) Like 
trespass, this right of exclusion provided a workable framework.2 With the onset of aviation however 
this right became impracticable. How could commercial aviation prosper if landowners could veto travel 
through patches of air-space far above their property?
For almost half a century, law makers and scholars wrestled with how to reconcile common law rules 
governing airspace with the advent of modern aviation.3 The regulatory system ‘muddled through’. In 
the US it wasn’t until 1942, when an American chicken farmer sued the US Military for the impact their 
,(>B3=-./#5(;5&1)#%9:#%9:#(.#%-)#'%-'<&.)#*%9*#9#>9=#+(1>91:#>9)#+(2.:"#C,*-;9*&,=@#*%&#D261&;&#
Court upheld the farmer’s complaint, agreeing that he did indeed have a right to the air above his land, 
and awarded him compensation. However in doing so the Court drew an important distinction between 
‘usable’ and ‘navigable’ airspace, declaring that navigable airspace was a “public highway” for air travel 
and not under the exclusive control of landowners.4
In effect, the strict property rights implied by the ad caelum rule had been augmented with a set of 
governance rules, which in practice had converted navigable airspace into a regulated commons. In the 
=&91)#*(#'(;&@#*%&)&#/(0&1.9.'&#12,&)#5&'9;&#;(1&#1&8.&:#9.:#61&'-)&@#&)6&'-9,,=#-.#1&)6(.)&#*(#*%&#
popularisation of condominiums in the 1960s. Without changing the underlying doctrine, new governance 
rules had adapted the property rights system to make it more compatible with a new technological reality, 
and the evolving needs of society.  
A similar process of legal evolution applied in Australia and in the early 1950s Australian state 
governments began introducing similar regulation. The Damage by Aircraft Act, 1952 (N.S.W.) was the 
81)*#(+#*%&#D*9*&#E'*)"#D&'*-(.#F#1&9:)G
!"#$%&'"(#)*$++#+',#'(#-,).,%&#"/#&-,).$))#"-#'(#-,).,%&#"/#(0')$(%,1#23#-,$)"(#"(+3#"/#&*,#4'5*&#"/#$(#
aircraft over any property at a height above the ground, which, having regard to wind, weather, and all 
&*,#%'-%06)&$(%,)#"/#&*,#%$),#')#-,$)"($2+,1#"-#&*,#"-7'($-3#'(%'7,(&)#"/#)0%*#4'5*&1#)"#+"(5#$)#&*,#
provisions of the Air Navigation Regulations are duly complied with.
This study explores some of the key activities of internet intermediaries to quantify the contribution of 
'(6=1-/%*#&4'&6*-(.)#*(#*%&#'1&9*-(.#(+#&'(.(;-'#09,2&#9.:#*(#&)*-;9*&#*%&#6(*&.*-9,#&'(.(;-'#5&.&8*#*(#
E2)*19,-9#+1(;#9#;(1&#3&4-5,&#'(6=1-/%*#&4'&6*-(.)#1&/-;&"
We begin by exploring the ways in which the internet has brought change and opportunity. Then, after 
looking at the value that the internet and internet intermediary activities bring to users, we look at the 
'()*)#9.:#5&.&8*)#(+#,-'&.)-./#0&1)2)#3&4-5,&#&4'&6*-(.)@#*%&#-;69'*#(+#)2'%#&4'&6*-(.)#(.#*%&#-.'&.*-0&#
*(#61(:2'&@#9.:#*%&#6(*&.*-9,#5&.&8*)#(+#3&4-5,&#&4'&6*-(.)#9.:#*%&#&4*&.)-(.#(+#)9+&#%915(21#61(0-)-(.)"#
2 The ad caelum rule also had its application below the ground, with the presumption that land owners had rights to the minerals their lands 
./&0+(&#'L$-(0"$0"#$#C.#>0(/&$/;$<1/8+=$?(&#*3$Q$)/='$+&'$*(=,#1L$-"(."$1#?+(&#'$,#*0#'$(&$0"#$G1/-&$D8$,(102#$/;$V/8+=$>1#1/)+0(,#4$\/-#,#1L$(&$
1855, colonial parliaments in Australia legislated for ownership of nearly all minerals to be retained by the Crown, and this arrangement  
persists today.
3 For a full discussion see: Banner, Stuart, (2008) D4)$E:'*$94#$F-2G$94#$F537.."#$5)$A)'53)"$8&3*0,/#$13)+$54#$D3&.45$H3)54#3*$E'> Harvard 
University Press 
4 For a full discussion see: Rule, Troy A, (2011) “Airspace in a Green Economy”, IAJ8$J,:$C#(&#:>$59, p. 281.
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BOX 2:    
INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES
$%&#HIJK#:&8.&)#-.*&1.&*#-.*&1;&:-91-&)#9)#*%&#'(;69.-&)#9.:#-.:-0-:29,)#>%(#61(0-:&#*%&#-.*&1.&*L)#
basic infrastructure and platforms by enabling communications and transactions between third parties 
as well as applications and services. Internet intermediaries give access to, host, transmit and index 
content originated by third parties or provide Internet-based services to third parties. They include:
! Internet Access Providers: that provide access to the internet to households, businesses, and 
government (e.g. Telstra, Optus and iiNet). In Australia, the technical legal term carriage service 
provider includes this group (although the legal term also extends beyond the online environment).
! Internet Hosts: that transform data, prepare data for dissemination, or store data or content on the 
internet for others. This category would include traditional hosts and some software as a service or 
cloud computing operations and e-mail providers (e.g. Google Docs and Gmail). 
! Search engines and portals:#*%9*#9-:#(.,-.&#.90-/9*-(.#5=#&.95,-./#&.:B2)&1)#*(#8.:#)-*&)@#(5M&'*)@#
news or other content (e.g. Google, Ask and Yahoo!). 
! E-commerce intermediaries: that enable online buying and selling, such as eBay or Amazon or, 
perhaps, App Stores like iTunes.
! Internet payment systems: that enable payments, such as Visa, PayPal etc. 
! Participative networked platforms, or User-Created Content (UCC) Platforms, that do not themselves 
create, or own, the content being published or broadcast. These would include sites that host blogs, 
YouTube and similar sites, and social networking sites, such as Facebook and LinkedIn.
F)73/#B$D#,54#3,"">$K?$LMNOOP$@'5#3'#5$@'5#3+#6&,3&#*$,'6$A)023&.45B$8'$87*53,"&,'$8.#'6,$1)3$C#1)3+>$87*53,"&,'$Q&.&5," 
8""&,'/#>$/&5&'.$ERAQ$LMNONP$94#$R/)')+&/$,'6$F)/&,"$C)"#$)1$@'5#3'#5$@'5#3+#6&,3&#*>$ERAQ>$S,3&*?$
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2. The internet has brought pervasive 
change and with it new opportunities
The Internet and digital tools have upended the 
traditional hierarchical creation and distribution 
roles. Not only are content creators and users 
increasingly one and the same, but there 
is also an increasing blurring of the content 
and the mechanism of delivery. Delivering 
anything online, be it content or services, often 
simply cannot be done without copying and 
communicating.
2.1  Internet intermediary 
activities
Some of the most common internet activities, 
including search and indexing, caching and 
hosting, involve copying and communicating 
content, so these internet activities risk infringing 
Australian copyright law unless exceptions apply 
or the use is otherwise permitted.
2.1.1  SEARCH AND INDEXING
Web search engines work by storing information 
about many web pages, which they retrieve 
from the HTML code in which web-pages are 
written.5 These pages are retrieved by a web 
crawler which is an automated program that 
browses the web and follows every link on a site. 
The contents of each page are then analysed to 
determine how it should be indexed (for example, 
words are extracted from the titles, headings or 
*>#.(+=$%#='*$.+==#'$?#0+$0+)*]4$^+0+$+D/20$-#D$
pages are stored in an index database for use 
in later queries. Some search engines store all 
or part of the source page in a cache as well as 
information about the web pages.6 
 
The purpose of an index is to allow information 
to be found as quickly as possible. When a user 
enters a query into a search engine (e.g. using 
keywords), the engine examines its index and 
provides a listing of best-matching web pages 
according to its criteria, usually with a short 
*2??+18$./&0+(&(&)$0"#$'/.2?#&03*$0(0=#$+&'$
sometimes parts of the text. The index is built 
from the information stored. 
The usefulness of a search engine depends 
on the relevance of the results it produces for 
the user. While there may be millions of web 
pages that include a particular word or phrase, 
some pages may be more relevant, popular or 
authoritative than others. Most search engines 
employ methods to rank the results to provide 
0"#$<D#*03$1#*2=0*$%1*04$\/-$+$*#+1."$#&)(&#$
decides which pages are the best matches 
and what order the results should be shown in, 
varies widely from one engine to another. 
Search engines provide a service both to end 
users, enabling them to more easily locate the 
information they need, and to internet content 
publishers, by making the information they 
publish more easily discoverable, thereby 
bringing users to their content. In internet 
search, content and the mechanism of delivery 
have blurred. Search engines copy and 
communicate content, but only do so in the 
course of enabling and facilitating its discovery 
and delivery.
5 This outline is drawn from < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_search_engine > 
6 Web publishers can request their content be excluded by the use of robots.txt code, which tells the search engine not to index this content.
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2.1.2  CACHING
Web caching is the temporary storage of web 
/DF#.0*$_#4)4$-#D$>+)#*]$;/1$=+0#1$1#01(#,+=4$!"#1#$
+1#$0"1##$*()&(%.+&0$+',+&0+)#*$0/$-#D$.+."(&)9$
! Reduced bandwidth consumption (fewer 
requests and responses that need to go over 
the network);
! Reduced server load (fewer requests for a 
server to handle); and 
! Reduced latency (since responses for cached 
requests are available immediately, and 
closer to the client being served). 
Together, they reduce costs and improve the 
performance of the internet.7
Caching is widespread. Most browsers use 
some form of caching on individual PCs, serving 
content locally when, for example, the user 
hits the back button or multiple pages from a 
site contain the same background images and 
content. Most ISPs and organisations of any size 
also use caching in an effort to reduce network 
01+;%.$+&'$*>##'$2>$2*#1$+..#**4$!"#*#$>1/C8$
caches work on the same principle, but at 
much larger scale, as there may be hundreds 
perhaps thousands of users behind them. 
Caches can also be placed in front of content 
servers (i.e. at the content originating end) 
0/$"#=>$?+&+)#$01+;%.$=/+'$+0$0(?#*$/;$>#+R$
requests for popular content.  
In recent years web pages have become 
more dynamic, now often being assembled 
in real time in response to individual requests 
(&$/1'#1$0/$0+(=/1$./&0#&0$0/$+$2*#13*$=/.+0(/&$
or target advertising. This has made caching 
?/1#$'(;%.2=04$E*$+$1#*2=0$/;$0"(*L$+&'$+$1+&)#$
of technical reliability and security issues, the 
last 10 years or so have seen the emergence 
of content delivery networks (CDNs), which are 
in essence a more complex form of caching 
that rather blur the distinction between caching 
and hosting. 
7 This outline is drawn from < http://www.web-caching.com/welcome.html >
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BOX 3:  
AKAMAI TECHNOLOGIES
Akamai Technologies arose at MIT and began a commercial service in 1999. Based on mathematical 
)(,2*-(.)#*(#-.*&1.&*#*19+8'#9.:#)&'21-*=#-))2&)@#E<9;9-#%9)#5&'(;&#(.&#(+#*%&#>(1,:L)#,91/&)*#'(.*&.*#
delivery networks (CDNs).
Akamai provides a service to companies that have content on the Internet (Akamai’s customers), to more 
&+8'-&.*,=#:&,-0&1#*%-)#'(.*&.*#*(#2)&1)#51(>)-./#*%&#>&5#9.:#:(>.,(9:-./#'(.*&.*"#E<9;9-#:(&)#*%-)#5=#
*19.)691&.*,=#;-11(1-./#'(.*&.*#+1(;#'2)*(;&1#)&10&1)#B#)(;&*-;&)#9,,#)-*&#'(.*&.*@#9.:#)(;&*-;&)#M2)*#
;&:-9#(5M&'*)#)2'%#9)#92:-(@#/196%-')@#9.-;9*-(.#9.:#0-:&("#$%(2/%#*%&#:(;9-.#.9;&#-)#*%&#)9;&@#*%&#
IP address points to an Akamai server or another user’s machine that Akamai is using as a server, rather 
than the customer’s server. The Akamai server is automatically picked depending on the type of content 
and the user’s network location.
The Akamai Network is one of the world’s largest distributed computing platforms, with more than 95,000 
secure servers equipped with proprietary software deployed in 71 countries. These servers reside within 
approximately 1,900 of the world’s networks monitoring the internet in real time – gathering information 
95(2*#*19+8'@#'(./&)*-(.#9.:#*1(25,&#)6(*)"#E<9;9-#2)&)#*%-)#-.*&,,-/&.'&#*(#(6*-;-)&#1(2*&)#9.:#1&6,-'9*&#
data dynamically to deliver content and applications more quickly, reliably, and securely.
E<9;9-L)#'2)*(;&1)#-.',2:&#;9.=#(+#*%&#;9M(1#'(.*&.*#)-*&)#N&"/"#-$2.&)#D*(1&@#O2-'<$-;&#;(0-&)@#PPJ#
-Q,9=&1@#R9'&5((<@#E;9S(.@#$>-**&1@#T&*3-4@#9.:#;9.=#;(1&U"
Sources: http://www.akamai.com/html/technology/index.html, http://video.mit.edu/watch/the-akamai-story-from-theory-to-
03,/5&/#%TNTMU$,'6$4550BUU#'?:&-&0#6&,?)3.U:&-&U8-,+,&V9#/4')").&#*?$
A CDN is a large distributed system of servers 
deployed in multiple locations on the internet to 
serve content from a local server to end users 
with high availability and high performance.8 
Today CDNs serve a large fraction of internet 
./&0#&0L$(&.=2'(&)$-#D$/DF#.0*$_#4)4$0#C0L$
graphics, URLs and scripts), downloadable 
/DF#.0*$_#4)4$?#'(+$%=#*L$*/;0-+1#L$'/.2?#&0*]L$
applications (e.g. e-commerce, portals), live 
streaming media, on-demand streaming media 
and social networks. CDN operators are paid 
by content providers, such as media companies 
and e-commerce vendors, to deliver their 
content to their audience of end users. In turn, a 
CDN pays ISPs, carriers and network operators 
for hosting its servers in their data centres. 
In addition to better performance and 
+,+(=+D(=(08L$G^X*$+=*/$/;B/+'$0"#$01+;%.$*#1,#'$
'(1#.0=8$;1/?$0"#$./&0#&0$>1/,('#13*$/1()(&$
infrastructure, resulting in cost savings for the 
content provider, and giving the content provider 
a degree of protection from denial of services 
(DoS) attacks, by using their large distributed 
*#1,#1$(&;1+*012.021#$0/$+D*/1D$0"#$+00+.R$01+;%.4
8 This outline of CDNs is drawn from < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_delivery_network >
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While there are many challenges in managing 
caches and CDNs well, they can have 
advantages for everyone: 
!$ M*#1*$.+&$D#&#%0$0"1/2)"$;+*0#1$+..#**$-(0"$
reduced waiting (latency);
!$ :N7*$+&'$/0"#1$/1)+&(*+0(/&*$.+&$D#&#%0$
0"1/2)"$1#'2.#'$D+&'-('0"$+&'$01+;%.$
costs; and 
! Web publishers and content owners can 
D#&#%0$D#.+2*#$0"#(1$./&0#&0$(*$?/1#$1#+'(=8$
accessible and they do not need to invest as 
much in server infrastructure to handle peak 
loads. Reduced latency at the user end can 
be particularly important for web content 
publishers as slow response and delays 
turn users away from sites, especially 
e-commerce sites. 
As in the case of search, while content is 
copied and communicated it is only done for the 
purpose of facilitating delivery.
2.1.3  HOSTING
There are many types of internet hosts, 
including web hosts, commercial and user 
generated content hosting, social networks, 
software as a service and cloud computing 
services. All host content, make it available and 
facilitate its delivery to users.
! Web hosts may simply provide an always-
on platform for individuals and smaller 
organisations, so that they can make their 
web site available 24/7 using a shared 
infrastructure with higher connection speed 
than might be affordable for the individual 
organisations themselves. Most ISPs and 
many other more specialist web hosts 
provide such services.
! File storage hosts provide a platform 
for users to store information, making it 
available 24/7 from any location, providing 
/;;Q*(0#$*#.21(08$+&'$#&+D=(&)$*"+1(&)$/;$%=#*$
among work, family or social groups. This 
can include documents, photos, videos, and 
other content. Examples include Dropbox or 
FilesAnywhere, Flickr or Photobucket, and 
YouTube or Vimeo.  
! Social networks also host content, including 
user-generated content, adding a range 
of network services that enable users to 
communicate and share. Examples include 
Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn.
! Cloud services also host content, providing 
a more complete range of services to users, 
;1/?$%=#$*0/1+)#$0/$*/;0-+1#$+*$+$*#1,(.#4$
There are many cloud services providers. 
Dropbox, iCloud, Google Docs and Gmail 
are examples of the fast burgeoning world of 
consumer cloud services. 
An important advantage of hosting can be 
in facilitating the operation of much smaller 
>/10+D=#$'#,(.#*$0"+0$?+8$&/0$"+,#$*2;%.(#&0$
storage capacity in their own right, but can 
access cloud hosted content. The advantages 
for users include access and storage in a more 
convenient, secure and less expensive way 
than they might be able to manage individually, 
as well as a range of additional sharing, 
management tools and services. 
15 
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2.2  Copyright and 
intermediary activities
While intermediaries perform a vital 
function, as Weatherall notes with some 
understatement,9 their position under Australian 
copyright law makes Australia “a less 
conducive investment environment for Internet 
Intermediaries than competitor countries”.
1.  Reproduction Rights: Due to the way 
that digital technology functions, almost 
all digital activity involves copying material 
into digital memory. The way reproduction 
(*$.211#&0=8$'#%&#'$(&$E2*01+=(+&$./>81()"0$
law, such copies are potentially a breach of 
copyright, and internet intermediaries and 
their users could be held accountable. At its 
extreme, it becomes analogous to a postal 
company being held liable for delivering the 
material of a pirate publishing house.
2.  Communication Rights: Internet 
intermediaries are currently at risk of 
D#(&)$./&*('#1#'$`F/(&0$./??2&(.+0/1*a$
of copyright material, though the legal 
position remains unclear. Under Australian 
copyright law, it is the person responsible 
for determining the content of the 
communication who communicates the 
material. The very recent Full Court of the 
Federal Court decision in the Optus Now  
.+*#$%&'(&)$0"+0$W>02*$-+*$*/=#=8$/1$F/(&0=8$
responsible for making recordings of free 
to air broadcasts chosen by its subscribers, 
"+*$(&0#&*(%#'$2&.#10+(&08$+*$0/$0"#$#C0#&0$
of liability of cloud service providers in 
Australia.10
3.  Authorisation liability: Australian law 
creates the risk of secondary liability for 
a wider range of activities than in other 
countries, particularly the US, but also 
Canada and the UK. In contrast to the Sony 
doctrine in the US, which limits liability for 
the provision of devices with substantial 
non-infringing uses, Australian authorisation 
liability still focuses on whether the entity 
has taken “reasonable steps” to prevent 
infringement. As Weatherall argues, if 
F2')#?#&0$(*$D+*#'$/&$+&$+**#**?#&0$/;$
whether intermediaries have done enough 
to prevent infringement, then predicting the 
outcomes of potential litigation becomes 
`#C01+/1'(&+1(=8$'(;%.2=04a
Consequently, Australian internet intermediaries 
face higher risks of both direct and indirect 
liability for copyright infringement in 
circumstances where liability would not be 
imposed in comparable countries. As a result, 
the current copyright regime in Australia is likely 
to be discouraging innovation and investment 
in intermediary activities and in the digital 
economy more broadly. 
9 Weatherall, K. (2011) @'5#3'#5$@'5#3+#6&,3&#*$,'6$A)023&.45B$8'$87*53,"&,'$8.#'6,$1)3$C#1)3+, Australian Digital Alliance.  
Available < http://www.digital.org.au/our-work/publication/internet-intermediaries-and-copyright-australian-agenda-reform >
10$N##$W>02*$=/**$./2='$*0(B#$;2021#$.=/2'$(&&/,+0(/&$(&$E2*01+=(+L$b#'(+$1#=#+*#L$E2*01+=(+&$^()(0+=$E==(+&.#L$@Zth April, 2012, available at  
< "00>9cc---4'()(0+=4/1)4+2c?#'(+c?#'(+Q1#=#+*#Q/>02*Q=/**Q./2='Q*0(B#Q;2021#Q.=/2'Q(&&/,+0(/&Q+2*01+=(+ > National Rugby League Investments Pty 
Limited v Singtel Optus Pty Ltd [2012] FCAFC 59 (27 April 2012) available at < http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCAFC/2012/59.html >
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2.3  Economic implications 
and the rationale for change
Because many digital services can be provided 
at a distance, the relative cost (including risk) of 
different national copyright systems for investors 
and entrepreneurs, including content producers, 
intermediaries and users, affects the location 
of investment. From an economic perspective, 
the key issue is to strike a balance between the 
incentive to create content and the opportunities 
for intermediaries and users to innovate, with the 
#./&/?(.$>/=(.8$0+*R$D#(&)$0/$F/(&0=8$/>0(?(*#$
their surplus. 
To encourage innovation and investment we 
&##'$+$B#C(D=#$./>81()"0$1#)(?#$;/1$(&0#1?#'(+18$
activities that: 
! Does not unduly reduce the revenue of rights 
holders and/or content producers, and so 
reduce the incentive to create content; and 
! Minimises the overall activity costs 
and transaction costs of publishers, 
intermediaries and users.
We know that things continue to change. Not 
only is the recent past a lesson in the limitations 
of accommodating new technology by making 
+$*01(&)$/;$*>#.(%.$#C.#>0(/&*$;/1$R&/-&$
intermediary activities, but the approach can also 
be expected to continue to fail us in the future. 
D6&'-8'#&4'&6*-(.)#>-,,#9,>9=)#5&#6,9=-./#
catch-up and new innovative intermediary 
activities welcomed by the public will still 
be at risk from copyright. Hence, we need a 
3&4-5,&#&4'&6*-(.#+(1#-.*&1.&*#-.*&1;&:-91=#
activities, as well as an extension of safe 
harbour provisions to intermediaries.
The economic rationale for granting exceptions 
or limitations to copyright and extending safe 
harbour provisions is a function of the negligible 
costs (including risks) that doing so entails, 
0/)#0"#1$-(0"$0"#$D#&#%0*$0/$-"(."$(0$.+&$)(,#$
1(*#4$b/1#$*>#.(%.+==8L$0"#$?#1(0$/;$'/(&)$*/$(*$+$
function of: 
! the lack of a downside (indeed the 
overwhelming likelihood of net upsides) for 
almost all rights holders; 
! high transaction costs associated with 
licensing (e.g. where there are a very large 
number of potential rights holders); 
! lower costs and risks for all stakeholders; 
! the likelihood of innovation and industry 
development advantages; and 
!$ 0"#$-('#1$D#&#%0*$0"+0$.+&$B/-$0/$0"#$
productivity of copyright-using industries.
This study explores some of the key activities 
of internet intermediaries, including search and 
index, caching and hosting, through the lens of 
these economic criteria. The aim is to quantify 
0"#$./&01(D20(/&$/;$B#C(D=#$./>81()"0$#C.#>0(/&*$
to the creation of economic value, and estimate 
0"#$>/0#&0(+=$#./&/?(.$D#&#%0$0/$E2*01+=(+$;1/?$
+$?/1#$B#C(D=#$./>81()"0$#C.#>0(/&*$1#)(?#4
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3. The value of intermediary 
activities
The activities of internet intermediaries 
(e.g. search and indexing, caching and 
hosting) provide value to internet users. 
We should facilitate them wherever 
possible, particularly when there is no 
'()*#*(#(*%&1)#9.:#6(*&.*-9,,=#)-/.-8'9.*#
>-:&1#5&.&8*)"
We can think of the value of internet services 
in various ways. Firstly, the value people 
attribute to the internet must be at least equal 
to the value they place on the time they spend 
on it. Secondly, we use the internet to reduce 
costs elsewhere – for instance to reduce our 
costs of searching for information, banking 
or buying airline tickets – and these savings 
can be evaluated. Finally, some consumers 
would be prepared to pay more to access the 
&#0$0"+&$0"#8$'/$>+84$!"(*$<./&*2?#1$*21>=2*3$
.+&$D#$#*0(?+0#'4$U#$=//R$D1(#B8$+0$#+."L$
%1*0$#*0+D=(*"(&)$0"#$&#.#**+18$D+*#$'+0+$;/1$
estimation, and then using it to estimate these 
various forms of economic value.
While the approaches are different, the things 
being measured are different, and studies 
were conducted at different times, the results 
paint a consistent picture. They show the 
enormous value of the internet to Australian 
users, and the value of various forms of web 
content and services facilitated by internet 
intermediary activities. 
3.1  Use value
Use value measures the time users spend on 
particular activities and then values that time. 
For internet users, use value can be estimated 
from the number of intermediated activities 
performed and the time spent performing them. 
Surveys of internet activity at home and at work 
show that internet use is both increasing rapidly 
and changing in its nature. Hence, such surveys 
provide no more than snap-shot estimates of 
use value. Moreover, such estimates are silent 
on the value of the information discovered 
through searching online or of communicating 
via social networks.
Estimates of internet activity vary as the 
methods of data collection and analysis vary, 
and levels of activity vary between countries 
and change rapidly over time. In mid-April 
2011, Nielsen reported that Australian users 
now average 21 hours and 42 minutes a week 
online, up from 17 hours and 36 minutes in 
2009.11 Search and navigation were reported 
to account for around 3% of time spent online 
at the end of 2010, portals for 17% and social 
networking for a further 21%.12 
Looking at global internet use, Go-Gulf report 
that 92% of internet users have used the 
internet for sending e-mails and for using search 
engines, 83% for getting more information 
related to health or hobbies, 82% for searching 
directions, 81% for getting weather information, 
78% for information on new products, 76% 
for reading news, 72% for entertainment and 
11  < http://www.theaustralian.com.au/media/net-users-logged-on-21-hours-a-week/story-e6frg996-1226036913878 >
12  < http://thenextweb.com/au/2011/10/20/has-australias-interest-in-social-media-peaked-new-comscore-data-suggests-it-may-have/ >
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71% for online shopping. Social networking is 
the most time consuming activity. An average 
internet user spends around 22% of their time 
on social networking sites, 21% on searches, 
20% on reading content, 19% on e-mails and 
communication, 13% on multimedia sites and 
5% on online shopping.13 
The ACMA Communications Report 2010-11 
>1#*#&0#'$+&$/,#1,(#-$/;$E2*01+=(+3*$/&=(&#$
activities, noting that:
! Australians spent an average of 36 hours 
online during June 2011 (from home), a 
total of 443 million hours during the month 
nationally.
! There were 19.2 billion web pages viewed 
from home during June 2011, by 12.3 million 
people. Of these, Google search accounted 
for 9.8 million page views and Google image 
search a further 3.6 million, and Facebook 
accounted for 7.6 million page views.
! During June 2011, 8.6 million Australians 
accessed social network and user generated 
content sites from home. A total of 36 million 
hours were spent on Facebook alone.14
While incomplete, these data give a sense of 
0"#$2*#1$0(?#$*>#&0$+&'$,+=2#$/;$*>#.(%.$/&=(&#$
activities (e.g. search and social network hosts).
For user time, we can estimate the value of an 
hour spent at work from average weekly wages 
reported by the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(ABS). Deighton et al. (2009) noted that there is 
no market price for an hour spent in recreation 
or leisure, although there is an opportunity 
cost. If work time is discretionary, then it has 
been argued that the wage rate measures the 
opportunity cost of leisure time. If not, and in 
particular for people in school, the elderly or 
unemployed, the wage rate over-estimates the 
value of a leisure hour.15 To account for this, we 
+'F2*0$0"#$+,#1+)#$-+)#$1+0#$0/$0+R#$+../2&0$
of the percentage of working age population in 
Australia (67%) and labour force participation 
(65%), and so we use 44% of the wage rate to 
value leisure time. Average weekly earnings 
in Australia were $1,034 in November 2011, or 
around $26 per hour for a 40 hour week.16 
If 12.3 million Australians spent an average 
of 36 hours online per month from home 
during June 2011, then at 44% of the wage 
rate, their online time would be worth around 
$60 billion a year circa 2011. 
! With 21% of online time spent on search, 
navigation and portals, pro rata the use value 
of search for Australian home internet users 
would be equivalent to $12.6 billion a year.
! With 22% of online time spent on social 
networks, pro rata the use value of social 
network hosting for Australian home  
internet users would be equivalent to  
$13.2 billion a year.
13  http://www.go-gulf.com/blog/online-time
14  ACMA (2011) Communications Report 2010-11, ACMA, Canberra. Available www.acma.gov.au 
15  Deighton, J. and Quelch, J. (2009) R/)')+&/$W,"7#$)1$54#$86(#35&*&'.%F700)35#6$@'5#3'#5$R/)*2*5#+, Report to the Interactive Advertising Bureau, 
June 2009. Available < http://www.iab.net/insights_research/947883/economicvalue >
16  ABS (2012) Average Weekly Earnings, Australia. Cat No 6302.0.
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3.2  Activity time and cost 
savings
Activity cost savings arise as online activities 
#&+D=#$#;%.(#&.(#*$_#4)4$/&=(&#$*"/>>(&)$+&'$ 
bill payments).
Deloitte Access Economics (2011) explored the 
D#&#%0*$/;$0"#$(&0#1&#0$;/1$E2*01+=(+&$"/2*#"/='*$
(&$0#1?*$/;$0(?#$*+,#'$+&'$#;%.(#&.8$)+(&*L$
and they suggested that the annual value to 
the Australian economy that accrues to 
households from accessing the internet was 
$53 billion circa 2010 (i.e. close to the use 
value estimate when the earlier date is taken into 
account). This comprised four elements:
! Search: The ability to search for information 
?/1#$#;%.(#&0=8$/&$0"#$(&0#1&#0$-+*$#*0(?+0#'$
to be worth the equivalent of $500 per person 
a year, or $7 billion in total nationally.
! Variety: The increase in the variety of goods 
+&'$*#1,(.#*$+,+(=+D=#$/&=(&#$+.1/**$?+F/1$
online retail spending categories was estimated 
to be worth $16 billion a year to Australians.
! Convenience: The internet saves people 
a substantial amount of time performing 
necessary everyday tasks like banking, paying 
bills and dealing with government. Assuming a 
typical internet user saves around half an hour 
#+."$-##RL$0"#$#*0(?+0#'$,+=2#$/;$0"(*$D#&#%0$
to consumers is $8 billion a year.
! Recreation: Consumer gains from 
recreational use of the internet were estimated 
to be around $2,000 for the average person, 
equivalent to $22 billion a year nationally.17
Updating the Deloitte Access Economics 
numbers to the end of 2011 to take account of 
increased use, suggests that search would be 
worth around $11.5 billion a year (i.e. very close 
to the use value estimate).
3.3  Contingent value and 
consumer welfare
There have been a number of attempts to measure 
the value of internet content and services using 
contingent valuation and welfare economics 
techniques. Contingent valuation is based on 
surveys of users, asking how much they would be 
willing to pay; and consumer welfare or surplus is the 
amount that consumers would have been willing to 
pay for something over and above what they did pay.
McKinsey & Company (2010) reviewed previous 
studies that had attempted to value the internet and 
undertook their own survey-based analysis (using 
./&0(&)#&0$,+=2+0(/&c*0+0#$>1#;#1#&.#*$+&'$./&F/(&0$
analysis).18 
Looking at the value of a wide range of internet 
services, they estimated the consumer surplus to be 
close to EUR 100 billion in the US and IAB Europe 
countries,19 or approximately EUR 40 per month per 
household (Figure 1).
McKinsey also found that four services generated 
more than 50% of the total surplus in 2010: mail 
(16%), search (15%), social networks (11%) and 
instant messaging (10%). They also estimated that, 
after subtracting what they pay, the surplus derived 
by users who pay for web services was similar to 
that derived by other users – perhaps suggesting 
that the pay versus free mix may be close to optimal.
17  Deloitte Access Economics (2011) The Connected Continent. Available < http://www.deloitte.com/au/connectedcontinent >
18 McKinsey & Company (2010) Consumers driving the digital uptake: The economic value of online advertising-based services to consumers, Report to the 
Interactive Advertising Bureau (Europe), September 2010. Available < http://www.iab.net/insights_research/947883/consumers_driving_digital_uptake >
19 IAB Europe includes: France, Germany, Russia, Spain, the UK, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey.
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FIGURE 1:   
INTERNET SURPLUS  
(EUR 190 BILLION PER  
YEAR, 2010)
X)5#B$C#1#3*$5)$54#$IF$,'6$@8H$ 
Europe countries.
Source: McKinsey & Company (2010) 
Consumers driving the digital uptake:  
The economic value of online advertising-
based services to consumers, Report to the 
@'5#3,/5&(#$86(#35&*&'.$H73#,7$LR73)0#P>$
September 2010.
Given the similarity of results across the US and 
European countries studied, it is possible to use 
0"#*#$%)21#*$0/$#*0(?+0#$,+=2#*$;/1$E2*01+=(+4$U#$
use an exchange rate of EUR 0.70 to the dollar, 
?+R(&)$0"#$SMV$HY$>#1$"/2*#"/='$+$?/&0"$%)21#$
approximately $57 a month or $686 a year.
With 8.5 million households in Australia 
in 2011, on a simple pro rata basis, the 
estimated consumer surplus generated by 
web services would amount to more than  
$5.8 billion a year, of which:
! Search would generate around $8.60 per 
household per month, or $875 million a year;
! Social networks would generate around $6.30 
per household per month, or $645 million a 
year; and
! All hosting activities (excluding e-mail) would 
generate around $1.2 billion a year. 
Services
11%
Access
11%
Services
52%
Access
26%
Producer
Surplus
Consumer
Surplus
O/.2**(&)$*>#.(%.+==8$/&$*#+1."L$K2)"(&$#0$+=4$
(2011) extended the McKinsey study.20 They 
estimated the value of each search performed 
+0$dY$.#&0*L$-"(."$)(,#&$G/?*./1#3*$#*0(?+0(/&$
of 1.3 billion searches in Australia in 2010, would 
imply a value of around $650 million a year. While 
the exact shares differed between the countries 
surveyed, taking the approximate average shares 
of the developed countries would suggest that 
individual users and businesses would each 
realise around $175 million of that total. 
Taking a different approach, Bughin et al. 
(2011) then estimated the use value of search 
to knowledge workers, based on the share of 
knowledge workers in the workforce (approx. 
40%), the time spent by knowledge workers 
searching (approx. 5 hours a week or 12% of 
their time), and the average weekly wage. For 
Australia, that would imply a value of around 
$590 million a year.
20  Bughin, J. et al. (2011) The Impact of Internet Technologies: Search, McKinsey & Company. Available < http://www.mckinsey.com > 
21 
E
xcepting the F
uture
BOX 4:   
THE VALUE OF CACHING
J9'%-./#1&:2'&)#,9*&.'=#9.:#*%&#'9,,#(.#.&*>(1<#1&)(21'&)@#52*#5=#%(>#;2'%#9.:#*(#>%9*#5&.&8*#-)#
:-+8'2,*#*(#)9="#T&0&1*%&,&))@#9)#9.#&49;6,&@#>&#,((<#9*#)'&.91-()#1&,9*-./#*(#*%&#2)&1#*-;&#'()*#(+#,9*&.'=#
9.:#6())-5,&#9::-*-(.9,#*19+8'#'()*)"
User time cost of latency: As noted, the ACMA reported that there were 19.2 billion web pages viewed 
by Australians from home during June 2011. If caching reduces the waiting time for each page by an 
average of 1/2 a second, then at the discounted average weekly wage the user time cost of latency would 
have been around $360 million a year circa 2011. However this is clearly a substantial underestimate as 
reduced latency increases use and fosters innovation. 
E::-*-(.9,#*19+8'#'()*G#J(.)2,*9*-(.)#)2//&)*#*%9*#*(*9,#*19+8'#:&;9.:#(2*#(+#E2)*19,-9#-)#'211&.*,=#91(2.:#
VWW#?56)#6&1#;(.*%"#E1(2.:#VWX#(+#*%9*#*19+8'#-)#*(#*%&#CD"#$%&#-.*&1.&*#)%91&#(+#*%9*#*19+8'#-)#91(2.:#
80%, and around 60% of that is cachable. If caching had a 35% success rate, the potential capacity saving 
>(2,:#5&#91(2.:#YWV#?56)#6&1#;(.*%"#J(;5-.-./#:(;&)*-'#9.:#-.*&1.9*-(.9,#*19+8'#'()*)#)2//&)*)#9#
'()*#(+#91(2.:#Z[7#6&1#\56)#6&1#;(.*%@#-;6,=-./#9#*19+8'#'()*#)90-./#(+#Z["V#;-,,-(.#6&1#;(.*%#(1#Z!7#
million a year.
The estimates above massively underestimate the true value of caching to the internet which, in its 
various forms, has become ubiquitous and multi-layered. If we compare the internet we have with multi-
layered and sophisticated caching to its equivalent without caching, the latter would be crippled in its 
operation and, with all the loads placed on it today, not unlike the internet of the mid-1990s in which there 
were frequent outages and users sometimes found themselves waiting minutes rather than seconds for 
the delivery of content. 
The full value of caching is thus the value of the internet we have today less the value of a crippled 
internet working slowly, poorly and being prone to failure. Consequently, at the upper bound, one could 
attribute much of the entire value of the internet to caching.  
Source: Lateral Economics’ analysis. 
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FIGURE 2:   
THE USE VALUE OF THE INTERNET 
AND INTERMEDIARY ACTIVITIES 
(WITH INDICATIVE FULL VALUE  
OF CACHING)
F)73/#B$8754)3*Y$,',"2*&*?
More recently, BCG (2012) adopted a contingent 
valuation approach to estimate the value of 
online media to Australian household internet 
users (i.e. the value of the content rather than 
the mechanism of delivery). They suggested 
that online media was worth $24 billion a year 
in consumer surplus to Australians, or $3,882 
per connected internet household. They also 
suggested that $9.2 billion a year of this came 
from online content portals.21 
While they measure different things, taken 
together, these studies show the very 
considerable value to users of online activities 
and related internet intermediary services.
Full Value of Caching
Say 50% of Internet
Internet
$60bn pa
Caching
$400m pa
Search
$12bn pa
Social
Networks
$13bn pa
21 BCG (2012) A7"573#$H))+B$Z):$Q&.&5,"$[#6&,$,3#$@'(&.)3,5&'.$87*53,"&a. Available < http://www.bcg.com/expertise_impact/publications/
PublicationDetails.aspx?id=tcm:12-101244 >
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4. The costs of licensing versus  
B#C(D=#$#C.#>0(/&*
Keys to the extraordinary explosion of value 
on the internet has been its openness and 
the way in which that openness has permitted 
the driving down of transactions costs. Here 
is one of the architects of the internet, Vinton 
Cerf (2006), stressing the uniqueness and 
importance of this fact: 
Because the network is neutral, the creators 
of new internet content and services need 
not seek permission from carriers or pay 
*0#/&,"$1##*$5)$\#$*##'$)'"&'#?$8*$,$3#*7"5>$
we have seen an array of unpredictable new 
offerings … [E]ntrepreneurs need not worry 
about getting permission for their inventions 
will [sic] reach the end users … This is a direct 
contrast to closed networks like the cable 
video system, where network owners control 
what the consumer can see or do.22  
The effect of this new open network has 
been extraordinary. The speed and volume of 
communications has increased by a factor of 
a million or more since the early 1990s, with a 
corresponding proliferation of information.23 Jio 
Ito proposes the counterfactual of establishing 
Google in a closed network. Without open 
source software one would need millions of 
dollars to create the software on a proprietary 
operating system. “It would have required a 
huge team of people taking many years. Since it 
-+*$+$<*#+1."$#&)(&#3$(0$?/*0$=(R#=8$-/2='$"+,#$
been given to the phone company to design and 
12&4$4$4$4$!"(*$0/0+=$>1/F#.0$>1/D+D=8$-/2='$"+,#$
taken a decade and cost a billion dollars and 
would probably not even have worked properly.” 
In fact, the total cost of actually building and 
=+2&."(&)$0"#$%1*0$J//)=#$*#1,#1$-+*$>1/D+D=8$
only thousands of dollars using standard PC 
components, mostly open source software as the 
base and connecting to the Stanford University 
network which immediately made the service 
available, at no additional cost, to everyone else 
on the Internet.
The open standards and the small pieces loosely 
F/(&#'$"+'$.1#+0#'$+&$#./*8*0#?$/;$./?>/&#&0*$
and networks that dramatically lowered the cost 
of development, collaboration and delivery. This 
allowed people to innovate, launch, fail, connect, 
?+*"2>$+&'$1#?(C$(&$*2."$+&$#;%.(#&0$-+8$+&'$
at such low cost, that the center of innovation 
moved from the research laboratories of the 
giant companies to the startup and venture 
capital scene in Silicon Valley.
Of course, there were startups and venture 
/,0&5,"&*5*$\#1)3#$54#$@'5#3'#5>$\75$54#$&'<7#'/#$
and scale of this new engine of innovation 
was unprecedented. The Internet continues to 
disintermediate and disrupt sector after sector by 
lowering friction and enabling interoperability.24
22 Quoted in Lee Robin S. and Wu, Tim, 2009. “Subsidizing Creativity through Network Design: Zero-Pricing and Net Neutrality”, Journal of Economic 
S#3*0#/5&(#*, Volume 23, Number 3, Summer 2009—Pages 61–76, at p. 66.
23 Quiggin, John. 2012, “The Economics of New Media”, School of Economics and School of Political Science and International Studies, RSMG Working 
Paper Series, Working Paper: P12_1 University of Queensland. 
24 Joi Ito, Creative Commons: Enabling the next level of innovation, McKinsey and Co, What Matters, 30 October 2009. < http://whatmatters.
mckinseydigital.com/internet/creative-commons-enabling-the-next-level-of-innovation or http://tinyurl.com/yapz9mf >
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to control and exploit their work not be 
undermined, but so also it is important that our 
*8*0#?$/;$./>81()"0$=+-$D#$./&%)21#'$;/1$0"#$
new reality of the internet. It sounds entirely 
reasonable that rights holders should give 
permission for anyone to copy their work, but 
as we have seen, any digital process handling 
their work in any way – including to assist the 
rights holder in exploiting their work – involves 
copying. A postal service is not required 
0/$/D0+(&$0"#$1()"0*$"/='#1*3$>#1?(**(/&$0/$
transport their content. As this section of the 
report demonstrates, where law that developed 
in the analogue world is applied to the digital 
world of the internet it gives rise to a cascade of 
>#1?(**(/&*$-"(."$(*$&/0$F2*0$(?>1+.0(.+D=#$D20$
dramatically so. 
4.1  The licensing transaction 
value chain
One way of exploring the issue of potential 
copyright licensing costs is to look at the activity 
and transaction costs for stakeholders in the 
value chain (i.e. content publishers and/or rights 
holders, intermediaries and users), and explore 
the impacts of alternative ways of managing 
permissions and licensing activities. 
PwC (2011) outlined a simple transaction 
cost approach that looks at the activity and 
transaction costs for stakeholders in the value 
chain and explores the impacts of alternative 
ways of managing permissions and licensing 
activities. Figure 2 illustrates the economic 
framework PwC apply to considering individual 
copyright exceptions. It shows that exceptions 
-(==$D#$D#&#%.(+=$-"#1#$01+&*+.0(/&$./*0*$+1#$
"()"$+&'$0"#$(?>+.0$/&$1()"0*$/-&#1*3$#C>#.0#'$
income is low or zero.25
PwC (2011) suggested that:
This framework is useful in considering the 
case of Google’s core search engine business 
model. Considering the horizontal axis, the 
number of websites on the internet and the 
continual stream of new additions mean that 
the transaction costs associated with licensing 
the reproduction of works are likely to be high. 
Whilst these transaction costs may potentially 
be lowered through the development of a 
central rights management organization 
representing website creators, they would still 
be likely to remain high. This suggests the 
economic case for an exception for the core 
search engine function. The vertical axis is 
more challenging to evaluate. Google is able to 
monetise the content of the websites it copies 
,*$&5*$*#,3/4$17'/5&)'*$63&(#$53,1!/$,'6$*)$
revenues from advertising and, increasingly, 
other revenue streams. The assessment that 
would need to be made is whether these 
3#(#'7#*$,3#$*71!/&#'5"2$",3.#$5)$]7*5&12$54#$
transaction costs of Google licensing with 
rights owners for internet content.26 
We argue that this latter point is not a relevant 
consideration on the following page.
25  PwC (2011) 8'$#/)')+&/$,',"2*&*$)1$/)023&.45>$*#/)'6,32$/)023&.45$,'6$/)""#/5&(#$"&/#'*&'., Price Waterhouse Coopers, pp52-54.
26  PwC (2011) 8'$#/)')+&/$,',"2*&*$)1$/)023&.45>$*#/)'6,32$/)023&.45$,'6$/)""#/5&(#$"&/#'*&'., PwC, p54.
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FIGURE 3:  ILLUSTRATIVE EXCEPTIONS EVALUATION FRAMEWORK
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F)73/#B$S:A$LMNOOP$8'$#/)')+&/$,',"2*&*$)1$/)023&.45>$*#/)'6,32$/)023&.45$,'6$/)""#/5&(#$"&/#'*&'.>$ 
S3&/#$D,5#34)7*#$A))0#3*>$0^_?
The following sections develop and apply this 
framework. The analysis is based on a simple 
value chain that includes content publishers 
and rights holders, internet intermediaries, and 
2*#1*4$U#$=//R$+0$#+."$(&$021&L$%1*0$#*0+D=(*"(&)$
the base data for estimation and then estimating 
transaction costs using the PwC approach.
Before doing so, it is worth highlighting that 
the framework as expressed excludes the 
possibility – which is clear here – for exceptions 
which lower the risk to the search provider and 
so underpin investment in search, to promote 
the interests of rights holders rather than simply 
failing to damage them. While one might want 
to constrain search providers from providing 
material that could offer an alternative source of 
content for their users, the provision of search 
should be strongly presumed to be in rights 
"/='#1*3$(&0#1#*0*L$+&'$(&'##'$(*$-"+0$2&'#1>(&*$
the investment in search engine optimisation by 
-"(."$%1?*$*##R$0/$?+C(?(*#$0"#(1$,(*(D(=(08$/&$
search engines. 
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4.1.1  ONLINE CONTENT PUBLISHERS 
AND RIGHTS HOLDERS
There are various indicators of the number of 
publishers and rights holders and the content 
available online, including the number of internet 
hosts and domains. The following data on hosts 
and domains are from OECD (2011).27
! Hosts: A host is a machine or application 
./&&#.0#'$0/$0"#$(&0#1&#0$+&'$('#&0(%#'$
with a unique IP address. While there are 
technical limitations to host surveys (e.g. 
*/?#$?+8$D#$"(''#&$D#"(&'$%1#-+==*]L$0"#8$
provide a sense of network growth and 
accessibility. In January 2010, there were 
more than 730 million hosts worldwide, up 
;1/?$F2*0$/,#1$ZY$?(==(/&$(&$@YYY$/1$D8$@5I$
a year. There were almost 12.7 million hosts 
in the .au (Australian) country-code domain, 
up from 1 million in 2000 or by 28% a year. 
Of course, there will have been additional 
Australian hosts under global top level 
domain names (e.g. .com).
! Domain names: Domain name 
registrations are an indicator of web 
presence and the wish by those with a 
web presence to be easily recognisable. 
Worldwide, there were almost 200 million 
domain name registrations in mid-2010, up 
from little over 100 million in 2006. Domain 
name registrations under the .au (Australian) 
domain increased from 148,539 in 2000 to 
almost 1.8 million in 2010, or by 28% a year 
./?>+1#'$-(0"$-/1='-('#$)1/-0"$/;$F2*0$/,#1$
20% a year. Of course, domain names can 
also be registered under global top level 
domains, and in mid-2010 there were more 
than 2 million Australian domains registered 
under global top level domains, in addition to 
the almost 1.8 million under the .au country-
code domain - making a total of 3.8 million 
registered domain names from Australia 
(approximately 2% of the worldwide total).
Each of these indicates something about the 
amount of content and number of content 
producers and rights holders.
Taking domains as approximating the 
number of content publishers,28 and hosts as 
approximating the locations (addresses) of 
content, these indicators suggest that there are 
around 200 million online content publishers 
worldwide at 730 million addresses, of which 
almost 4 million content publishers are in 
Australia at around 15 million addresses.
4.1.2  INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES
Internet intermediaries are many and varied. 
Here we focus on search and indexing, caching 
and hosting activities.
! Search services involve spidering, 
indexing and often caching and displaying 
a copy of content in order to direct would-
be users to the content and services they 
seek. By making content discoverable, 
*#+1."$*#1,(.#*$0#&'$0/$(&.1#+*#$01+;%.$+0$
the content publishers website, potentially 
27 OECD (2011) ERAQ$A)++7'&/,5&)'*$E75"))-$MNOO, OECD, Paris. Available < http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/comms_outlook-2011-en >
28$X/0#$0"+0$0"(*$?#0"/'/=/)8$(*$*2DF#.0$(&$*/?#$.+*#*$0/$"2)#=8$underQ#*0(?+0#$/;$0"#$&2?D#1$/;$<>2D=(*"#1*3$+*$?+&8$*(0#*$T$*2."$+*$e/2!2D#$+1#$
platforms for thousands of different publishers.
27 
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increasing their revenue, and reduce the 
search and discovery time and costs faced by 
users. There are reported to be more than 170 
general web search engines, and there are 
many more specialist search activities.29
! Caching aims to provide users with faster 
access to commonly used content and reduce 
&#0-/1R$01+;%.4$U(0"/20$.+."(&)$0"#1#$-/2='$
=(R#=8$D#$?/1#$=/.+=$+&'$(&0#1&+0(/&+=$01+;%.L$
slower access and an increase in user access 
time, and a need for greater infrastructure 
investment. Caching is widespread among 
internet access and services providers, 
and many other businesses, organizations 
and educational institutions throughout the 
#./&/?8L$?+R(&)$(0$'(;%.2=0$0/$#*0(?+0#$0"#$
number of caching operations. 
! Hosts, be they operators of social networks 
or cloud services, provide platforms for social 
and professional communication, photo and 
video sharing, the commercial exchange 
of content, goods and services, and for 
(&;/1?+0(/&$"+&'=(&)$+&'$*0/1+)#$#;%.(#&.84$
Wikipedia lists around 225 active social 
network sites, and there are many hundreds 
/;$%=#$*0/1+)#L$.=/2'$*#1,(.#*$+&'$/0"#1$
specialist hosts.30
There were around 500 ISPs operating in 
Australia in June 2010, so for the purposes of 
preliminary estimation we assume that there are 
around 1,000 internet intermediaries providing 
caching, search and hosting services in Australia. 
4.1.3  INTERNET SUBSCRIBERS  
AND USERS
There are a number of ways to count internet 
use, including subscribers (i.e. people of 
business entities holding an internet access 
account) and users (i.e. people accessing the 
internet during a given period).
For subscribers, OECD (2011) reported that 
0"#1#$-#1#$@[@$?(==(/&$%C#'$D1/+'D+&'$+&'$
453 million wireless broadband subscribers in 
WSG^$./2&01(#*$(&$f2&#$@Y6YL$/;$-"(."$F2*0$
/,#1$d$?(==(/&$%C#'$+&'$6Y$?(==(/&$-(1#=#**$
subscribers were in Australia.31 ABS (2012) 
report 11.6 million internet subscribers in 
Australia in December 2011, of which more 
than 8.9 million were household subscribers 
and almost 2.7 million were business and 
government subscribers.32
Looking more broadly at users,  
including people who may not be subscribers, 
ACMA (2012) reported that there were 
12.3 million Australians accessing the 
internet from home during June 2011, while 
InternetWorldStats report almost 2.3 billion 
internet users worldwide at the end of 2011,  
of which 19.5 million were in Australia.33
29  < http://www.philb.com/webse.htm >
30  < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_social_networking_websites >
31  OECD (2011) ERAQ$A)++7'&/,5&)'*$E75"))-$MNOO, OECD, Paris. Available < http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/comms_outlook-2011-en >
32  ABS (2012) @'5#3'#5$8/5&(&52>$87*53,"&,>$Q#/$MNOO>$81530DO006_201112.
33  < http://www.internetworldstats.com/ >
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4.2  Transaction cost 
estimates
As noted, PwC (2011) outlined an activity cost 
model for centralised and atomised content 
licensing that includes content producers/
rights holders, intermediaries and users, and 
#C>=/1#*$0"#$./*0*$+**/.(+0#'$-(0"$('#&0(%.+0(/&L$
negotiation and use activities. They also tabulate 
the associated cost estimates (Table 1), 
showing rights holders and intermediary/user 
copyright licensing activities as a transaction 
chain, with activity, frequency of that activity and 
estimated time involved. This provides a basis 
for preliminary estimates of possible activity and 
transaction costs facing internet intermediaries 
and rights holders in Australia.
TABLE 1:  PWC’S COPYRIGHT LICENSING ACTIVITIES TRANSACTION CHAIN
ACTOR TRANSACTION ACTIVITY FREQUENCY TIME
COST 
BASE
Rights 
holder
Responds to 
user’s contact
Responds to e-mail/receives 
telephone call to arrange date and 
time for discussion
One-off
30 
minutes
Average 
earnings 
Rights 
holder
Negotiation with 
user
Negotiates the price and terms of the 
copyright licence with the user
Annual 3 hours 
Average 
earnings
Rights 
holder
Invoices user
Draws up an invoice on a word 
processing application and sends to 
user over e-mail
Annual 
30 
minutes
Average 
earnings
Rights 
holder
Receives and 
processes 
payment
User sends payment through PayPal 
and Author logs on to receive funds 
and transfers into bank account
Annual
30 
minutes
Average 
earnings 
Intermediary 
User
Searches for the 
rights holder
Involves an in-depth search using 
different means if necessary including 
contacting publishing groups as well 
as searching for creator directly and 
contacting other agencies
One-off 1 hour
Average 
earnings 
Intermediary 
User
Makes contact 
with the rights 
holder
Writes e-mail/undertakes a telephone 
call to arrange date and time for 
discussion
Annual
30 
minutes
Average 
earnings 
Intermediary 
User
Negotiation with 
rights holder
Negotiates the price and terms of 
the copyright licence with the rights 
holder
Annual 3 hours
Average 
earnings 
Intermediary 
User
Undertakes 
payment
Receives invoice through e-mail and 
sends payment through PayPal
Annual
30 
minutes
Average 
earnings 
F)73/#B$H,*#6$)'$54#$,',"2*&*$)1$S:A$LMNOOP$8'$#/)')+&/$,',"2*&*$)1$/)023&.45>$*#/)'6,32$/)023&.45$,'6$/)""#/5&(#$"&/#'*&'.>$00`^%`a?
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For preliminary estimation we use the activity 
parameters in Table 1, in combination with the 
following:  
! ABS report average weekly wages in 
Australia in November 2011 of $1,034,  
which at 40 hours per week is around  
$26 per hour;
! Taking domain name registrations as 
indicative of the number of online content 
publishers, we estimate the number of 
content rights holders in Australia at  
3.8 million (200 million worldwide); and
! Based on ACMA reporting that there were 
more than 500 ISPs operating in Australia 
at the end of June 2010, we estimate the 
number of internet intermediaries providing 
caching, search and hosting services  
(i.e. users in the PwC schema) in Australia 
at 1,000.
With large numbers of content publishers and 
intermediaries involved in such transaction 
activities, even transactions with modest costs 
involved lead to very high transaction costs. 
Simply looking at Australian based intermediaries 
and content publishers, if all 1,000 intermediaries 
sought individual licenses from all 3.8 million 
potential content publishers, there would be  
3.8 billion transactions. Given transaction 
activities taking 9.5 hours at $26 per hour, the 
transaction costs would exceed $900 billion 
a year in Australia alone. If all the internet 
intermediaries in the world sought individual 
licenses to Australian content, the transaction 
costs would be in the trillions, not billions, and 
probably more than the annual production of the 
Australian economy.
In fact internet intermediaries rely largely 
on presuming that rights holders wish 
intermediaries to handle (and thus copy) their 
content especially since many intermediaries 
automate the process by which rights holders 
can opt out of the process. Yet relying on such 
an informal process involves greater risks for 
intermediaries under Australian copyright law 
0"+&$(0$-/2='$(;$-#$"+'$?/1#$B#C(D=#$#C.#>0(/&*$
and broader safe harbour provisions. 
If the 170 search engines listed at << www. 
philb.com/webse.htm >> transacted with all  
3.8 million Australian domain name registrants, 
it would involve 645 million transactions. If each 
transaction took 9.5 hours, then, at average 
weekly wages, the transaction costs would 
#C.##'$g6dY$D(==(/&$+$8#+14$$E&'$0"+0$(*$F2*0$;/1$
the Australian domain names. 
Turning now to caching activities, given their 
extent, licensing costs relating to caching by 
non-intermediaries might be higher. There are, 
for example, around 2.2 million businesses and 
+1/2&'$@YYLYYY$&/0Q;/1Q>1/%0$/1)+&(*+0(/&*$
(&$E2*01+=(+4$:;$F2*0$6YI$/;$0"#?$>#1;/1?#'$
some form of caching, their transaction costs 
for individually licensing Australian content 
would be many times greater than those of 
(&0#1?#'(+1(#*4$E)+(&L$(;$+==$0"#$<.+."#1*3$(&$0"#$
world sought individual licenses, the cost would 
be well into the trillions.
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When it comes to hosting and cloud services, 
internet intermediary activities are ubiquitous. 
The number of content producers in the user 
generated content era is large.34 Bughin et al. 
(2011) reported that across the countries they 
surveyed between 30% and 60% of all internet 
users generated content.35 If 30% to 60% 
of Australian internet users were treated as 
content owners, the potential transaction cost of 
individual licensing by internet intermediaries for 
the purposes of hosting could exceed $2 trillion 
a year.
What these estimates clearly suggest is that 
the cost for an internet intermediary of gaining 
+D*/=20#$./&%'#&.#$0"+0$0"#8$+1#$&/0$D1#+."(&)$
copyright is prohibitive. 
Of course, in future some more centralised 
and/or automated way may be found to do the 
necessary licensing at a relatively lower cost. 
The fact that this has not already happened 
suggests that its costs could outweigh 
(0*$D#&#%0*4$:&'##'$0"#$D#&#%0*$./2='$D#$
negligible, and the costs substantial. 
This seems particularly likely when one 
considers that even if a centralised licensing 
system were instituted, for instance via a 
collecting society, there would still be the 
problem of distribution of funds which in the 
case of the internet is layered and highly 
complex. In the schools context in Australia 
there has been some attempt to do this – and 
CAL and the schools have been completely 
unable to agree on a way to identify which 
rights holders wish to be paid leading to a 
scenario where the website copyright terms are 
inspected, website by website.
The current architecture of copyright establishes 
+&$<+&0(Q./??/&*3$/1$>1/>#108$1()"0*$0"(.R#0$
which cannot be negotiated without exorbitant 
cost. The concept of the thicket was popularised 
by Michael Heller in his book The Gridlock 
Economy, which details the way in which 
normal commerce can be severely impeded by 
property rights which are too numerous and/
/1$0//$'(;;2*#=8$'#%&#'$0/$#&+D=#$D2*(&#**#*$
0/$./*0$#;;#.0(,#=8$&+,()+0#$0"#?$./&%'#&0$0"+0$
0"#8$+1#$&/0$(&;1(&)(&)$/0"#1*3$>1/>#108$1()"0*4$
34 While it is true that in the case of user generated content, some form of explicit or implicit licensing of content takes place at the point of sign-up, in 
0"#$+D*#&.#$/;$#C.#>0(/&*$/1$#C0#&*(/&$/;$*+;#$"+1D/21$>1/,(*(/&*$0"(*$(*$&/0$=(R#=8$0/$D#$*2;%.(#&0$0/$+;;/1'$.#10+(&08$/;$>1/0#.0(/&4
35 Bughin, J. et al. (2011) The Impact of Internet Technologies: Search, McKinsey & Company. Available < http://www.mckinsey.com >
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BOX 5:   
CRIPPLING TRANSACTION COSTS AND THE ORIGINAL 
ROBBER BARONS
During the middle ages, the Rhine River through modern-day Germany was one of the great trade routes 
of Europe. Under the auspices of the Holy Roman Empire, certain feudal lords and the church were 
allowed to set up ‘toll-gates’ along the river. These came in the form of strategically placed castles and 
towers along the river’s length, many with large iron chains spanning the width of the river. Selected 
feudal lords and arch-bishops charged each cargo ship a toll, either in a standardised amount of silver 
coin, or an ‘in-kind’ payment from the merchant’s wares.
For many centuries the system worked. Merchants were granted safe passage down the river, and the 
tolls were simply another cost of doing business. However, during the Great Interregnum of 1250-1273, 
when there was no Roman Emperor and the grip of the Roman Empire loosened, the number of tolling 
stations exploded. So-called ‘Robber Barons’ erected their own castles and towers in between the 
(+8'-9,,=B)9.'*-(.&:#)*9*-(.)@#9.:#5&/9.#'(,,&'*-./#*%&-1#(>.@#(+*&.#915-*191=@#*(,,)"
The effect on trade was crippling. The cost of doing business simply became too great, and the 
merchants stopped coming. Everybody suffered. It was not until the accession of Emperor Rudolf of 
]95)521/@#>%(#>9)#>-,,-./#*(#19S&#'9)*,&)#-.#(1:&1#*(#62*#9#)*(6#*(#1(55&1#591(.=#*%9*#*%&#3(>#(+#*19:&#
returned to the Rhine River.
Michael Heller argues that rights thickets threaten prosperity in a range of areas in the contemporary 
West, most particularly in the area of intellectual property rights.
Source: Heller, Michael, 2008. The Gridlock Economy,: Too much ownership wrecks markets, stops innovation and costs lives, 
X#:$b)3->$S#3*#7*?
As illustrated in Box 5, rights thickets can be 
crippling where rights holders and users are 
adversaries. However the situation with internet 
intermediaries is different. In effect they are 
providing the service to the rights holders. Thus 
rights holders are not normally in a position to 
charge them for the privilege of distributing their 
content. The result is that the rights thicket that 
contemporary Australian copyright law creates 
is largely honoured in the breach. Businesses 
mostly go about their daily routines either 
unaware of the risks the law is imposing on 
them, or being prepared to bear the risk that a 
rights holder will pursue them for some failure to 
obtain permission. 
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4.3  The impacts on incentive 
to produce
E$.1(0(.+=$+*>#.0$/;$0"#$=#)+=$0#*0$/;$B#C(D=#$
#C.#>0(/&*$(*$0/$"+,#$1#)+1'$0/$1()"0*$"/='#1*3$
ability to exploit their rights.  This introduces 
a built in protection against opening any 
B//')+0#*$0"+0$2&'#1?(&#$1()"0*$"/='#1*3$1()"0*$
and so the incentive to create. In fact, the most 
likely impact on rights holder revenue resulting 
from such exceptions would be positive – from 
greater innovation and investment in content 
delivery.
BOX 6:   
FAIR DEALING VS FAIR USE: THE CASE OF KELLY V ARRIBA SOFT
In Australian law the exceptions to copyright that permit people to use copyrighted material without 
6&1;-))-(.#91&#+('2)&:#91(2.:#*%&#^+9-1#:&9,-./_#&4'&6*-(.)"#$%&)&#91&#,-;-*&:#*(#80&#)*9*2*(1=#6216()&)#
– research or study, parody or satire, criticism or review, and reporting on the news and use for the 
6216()&)#(+#M2:-'-9,#61('&&:-./)#(1#,&/9,#9:0-'&"36 Further, as Weatherall and Hudson have argued, these 
exceptions have tended to be applied in an ad hoc and restrictive ways.37
A.#'(.*19)*@#*%&#+9-1#2)&#&4'&6*-(.#-.#*%&#CD#91()&#+1(;#*%&#'(;;(.#,9>#91(2.:#*%&#D*9*2*&#(+#O2&&.#
E..&@#*%(2/%#-*#>9)#,9*&1#'(:-8&:#-.#*%&#E;&1-'9.#J(6=1-/%*#E'*#Y`ab#NYa#C"D"J"#c#YWaU"#$%-)#9,*&1.9*-0&#
M21-)612:&.'&#(+#d+9-1#2)&L#%9)#61(0-:&:#9#;2'%#;(1&#(6&.#&.:&:#9.:#3&4-5,&#:('*1-.&#>%-'%#
nevertheless protects rights holders exploitation of those rights. 
Under the doctrine a use is “fair” considering the following tests:
1.  the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
.(.B61(8*#&:2'9*-(.9,#6216()&)e
F"## *%&#.9*21&#(+#*%&#'(6=1-/%*&:#>(1<e
["## *%&#9;(2.*#9.:#)25)*9.*-9,-*=#(+#*%&#6(1*-(.#2)&:#-.#1&,9*-(.#*(#*%&#'(6=1-/%*&:#>(1<#9)#9#>%(,&e#9.:
4.  the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
The American case of Kelly v Arriba Soft 61(0-:&)#9.#-,,2)*19*-(.#(+#*%&#3&4-5-,-*=#(+#+9-1#2)&#9.:#*%&#
corresponding rigidity of our fair dealing exceptions. In that case, Kelly, a professional photographer 
)&,,-./#6%(*(/196%)#(.#%-)#>&5)-*&@#(5M&'*&:#*(#E11-59#D(+*#61&)&.*-./#,(>B1&)(,2*-(.#*%2;5.9-,#-;9/&)#
on its internet search engine. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that showing the thumbnails in no 
way interfered with Kelly’s market and that constituted a fair use of the material. 
Yet as Weatherall and Hudson argue,38 if such a case were before an Australian court there are no 
grounds for bringing Arriba’s activities within any of the statutory purposes in the fair dealing exception. 
This is unnecessarily restrictive particularly given the current rate of technological innovation. As such, 
-*#)-;6,=#-;6&:&)#*&'%.(,(/-'9,#-..(09*-(.#>-*%-.#E2)*19,-9#+(1#.(#:-)'&1.95,&#5&.&8*#*(#1-/%*)#%(,:&1)L#
interests.
36 Van Caenegem, W (2010), @'5#""#/57,"$S3)0#352$J,:$&'$87*53,"&, Kluwer Law International, p48
37 Weatherall, K and Emily Hudson (2005). C#*0)'*#$5)$54#$@**7#*$S,0#3B$c,&3$I*#$,'6$E54#3$A)023&.45$Rd/#05&)'*$&'$54#$Q&.&5,"$8.#$ 
Available at: < http://works.bepress.com/kimweatherall/6 >  (downloaded 4/5/2012)
38 Weatherall, K and Emily Hudson (2005). C#*0)'*#$5)$54#$@**7#*$S,0#3B$c,&3$I*#$,'6$E54#3$A)023&.45$Rd/#05&)'*$&'$54#$Q&.&5,"$8.#$ 
Available at: < http://works.bepress.com/kimweatherall/6 >  (downloaded 4/5/2012)
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A great deal of online content is in the form of 
free-to-use website information and promotional 
material put online for the purposes of enabling 
search and contact, access and downloading 
by agencies and people motivated to do so as 
+$>+10$/;$0"#$1/=#$/1$F/D4$!"#1#$(*$+=*/$./&0#&0$
made available on a paid access basis, with 
the payments received playing a part in the 
motivation to produce. 
Internet intermediary activities such as search, 
caching and hosting have no direct impact on 
the revenue from, and thereby incentive to 
produce, such content. If anything, search and 
indexing will make the content more useful and 
'(*./,#1+D=#$+&'$*/$*"/2='$(&.1#+*#$01+;%.$0/$
the content, including paying customers. As 
such, the impact of search and indexing on 
rights holders’ income and thereby their 
incentive to produce is more likely to be 
positive than negative.
In assessing the impact of a search-related 
#C.#>0(/&$/&$1()"0*$"/='#1*3$(&./?#L$7-G$
(2011) suggested that it was more challenging 
to evaluate because Google is able to monetise 
the content of the websites it copies as its 
search functions drive footfall and so revenues 
from advertising and increasingly, other revenue 
streams. They suggested that the assessment 
that would need to be made is whether these 
1#,#&2#*$+1#$*2;%.(#&0=8$=+1)#$0/$F2*0(;8$0"#$
transaction costs of Google licensing with rights 
owners for internet content.39 However their 
analysis seems to miss a key point. 
Google search (like other search services) 
generates revenue from providing the 
intermediary activity of search - by helping 
>#/>=#$%&'$./&0#&0L$-"(."$0"#8$.+&$0"#&$)/$0/4$
Search services do not generate revenue from 
the content itself. You cannot watch an AFL 
game on Google. You must navigate from the 
search to the content site, at which you may 
need to subscribe or pay to view. 
Hence, the level of revenue a search service 
provider generates from advertising has 
nothing to do with the potential revenue 
of the rights holders or the incentive to 
produce content. It does not take revenue 
away from rights holders, but rather generates 
revenue from the intermediary service of search 
(0*#=;L$-(0"$0"#$*#+1."$>1/,('#1$D#&#%0(&)$/&=8$
;1/?$+&8$*"+1#$0"#8$.+&$<?/&#0(*#3$/;$0"#$,+=2#$
their search services add. 
The case for exceptions to copyright lies in 
0"#$D+=+&.#$/;$./*0*$+&'$D#&#%0*4$\#1#$0"#$
transaction costs of compliance with copyright 
are high and the potentially negative impact 
/;$1()"0*$"/='#1*3$1#,#&2#$+&'L$0"#1#D8L$0"#$
incentive to produce is very low or negative 
depending on the circumstances. For internet 
intermediaries the transaction costs of 
compliance are literally prohibitive, and the 
(?>+.0$/&$1()"0*$"/='#1*3$1#,#&2#$(*$?/1#$=(R#=8$
to be positive than negative.
39  PwC (2011) 8'$#/)')+&/$,',"2*&*$)1$/)023&.45>$*#/)'6,32$/)023&.45$,'6$/)""#/5&(#$"&/#'*&'., PwC, p53.
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d4$!"#$D#&#%0*$/;$B#C(D=#$#C.#>0(/&*$
and extension of safe harbour 
provisions
!"#$D#&#%0*$/;$B#C(D=#$#C.#>0(/&*$+&'$#C0#&*(/&$
of safe harbour provisions lie not so much 
in additional gains in use, as much already 
takes place. Rather it is in reducing risk and 
uncertainty, which can have a substantial impact 
on investment and innovation.
While there are many possible costs and 
D#&#%0*$+**/.(+0#'$-(0"$)1+&0(&)$B#C(D=#$
exceptions and extending safe harbour 
provisions, here we focus on:
! the risks and costs associated with legal 
challenges; 
! the impacts of these risks on investment  
(i.e. how much does risk affect willingness  
to invest); and 
! the potential impacts on innovation.
5.1  Risks and costs 
associated with legal 
challenges
This section explores copyright-related legal 
costs, the number of copyright-related cases 
brought and the probability of litigation under 
different regimes. 
5.1.1 COPYRIGHT-RELATED LEGAL COSTS
Relatively little is known about the legal cost 
+**/.(+0#'$-(0"$E2*01+=(+3*$./>81()"0$1#)(?#4$
The costs of litigation include court fees (which 
are generally public) and the costs incurred by 
the parties (which are generally not publicly 
available). Courts make orders for costs, but: (i) 
such orders are not made in every case – often 
0"(*$(*$0"#$*2DF#.0$/;$&#)/0(+0(/&*$+&'$*#00=#?#&0h$
and (ii) where a court does make an order, it will 
=(R#=8$&/0$1#B#.0$0"#$;2==$./*0*$(&.211#'4$:&$)#&#1+=L$
a costs order will be <60% of costs actually 
incurred. Moreover, even these costs (whether 
&#)/0(+0#'$/1$/1'#1#']$-(==$/&=8$1#B#.0$0"#$'(1#.0$
costs (e.g. the costs of lawyers etc.), they will 
not include indirect costs (e.g. the opportunity 
./*0*$(&,/=,#'$(&$0"#$*+.1(%.#$/;$*0+;;$0(?#$0/$0"#$
litigation). Furthermore, it has to be noted that 
costs are often given as an estimate for the cost 
of going to trial, but, on average, only somewhere 
between 5% to 10% of cases will in fact go to trial.
5.1.2 THE NUMBER OF COPYRIGHT-
RELATED CASES
The number of cases arising is also better known 
in the US than in Australia. Most copyright cases 
in Australia run in the Federal Court, while a 
*?+==$&2?D#1$12&$(&$0"#$O#'#1+=$b+)(*01+0#*3$
Court. The Federal Court does not produce 
statistics to indicate how many copyright cases 
+1#$%=#'$#+."$8#+1L$D20$(0$'/#*$>1/'2.#$*0+0(*0(.*$
on the number of IP cases – which include trade 
mark cases and patent cases, as well as any 
other rights such as geographical indications. Our 
consultations suggest that it would be reasonable 
to estimate that around one-third of IP cases 
are copyright cases. Even if this overstates the 
number of copyright cases, it should be noted 
that it does not count the number of cases in 
0"#$O#'#1+=$b+)(*01+0#*3$G/210h$&/1$'/#*$(0$
include proceedings in the Copyright Tribunal, 
-"(."L$+=0"/2)"$+$&/&QF2'(.(+=$D/'8L$"#+1*$+&'$
determines disputes, some of which are very long 
and complicated, concerning the payment to be 
made for copyright uses under statutory licences 
– some of which would involve uses that might 
D#$./,#1#'$D8$+$B#C(D=#$#C.#>0(/&4$!"#1#$-#1#$
around 200 IP cases in Australia each year over 
0"#$=+*0$%,#$%&+&.(+=$8#+1*L40 of which perhaps  
70 per year would be copyright cases.41
40  Federal Court of Australia, Annual Report 2010-2011, p. 144. Report available at < http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/aboutct/ar2010.html >
41$$U#$"+,#$D+*#'$0"(*$/&$0"#$/>(&(/&$/;$+$>1+.0(0(/&#1$(&$0"#$%#='4
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TABLE 2:  COPYRIGHT CASES IN THE US AND AUSTRALIA, 2006-2011
COPYRIGHT CASES
CASES PER USD  
BILLION GDP
CASES PER MILLION 
POPULATION
Australia US Australia US Australia US
2006-2007 73 5,488 0.09 0.41 3.5 18.4
2007-2008 71 5,074 0.07 0.36 3.3 16.8
2008-2009 66 3,346 0.06 0.23 3.1 11.0
2009-2010 65 2,780 0.07 0.20 2.9 9.0
2010-2011 66 1,984 0.07 0.14 3.0 6.5
Average 68 3,734 0.07 0.27 3.2 12.3
F)73/#B$87*53,"&,'$c#6#3,"$A)735$@S$/,*#*>$,**7+&'.$OU_36$,3#$/)023&.45$/,*#*>$,'6$ 
http://www.us-ip-law.com/2011/11/where-or-where-did-copyright-litigation.html 
At around $144,000 each,42 70 copyright-
related cases a year would suggest legal 
costs in Australia of $10 million a year. The 
opportunity and other related costs would 
likely be larger, as might settlements and 
awards. 
5.1.3 PROBABILITY OF LITIGATION
One could argue that the introduction of fair 
use exceptions would increase the amount 
of litigation in Australia. It would not be very 
*21>1(*(&)$(;$B#C(D=#$#C.#>0(/&*$(&,/=,#'$?/1#$
legal costs in the US than our fair dealing 
#C.#>0(/&*$'/$"#1#L$&/0$F2*0$D#.+2*#$/;$0"#$
greater cost and litigiousness of the US legal 
system but also because fair use exceptions 
have done so much more legal work than our 
tightly subscribed fair dealing exceptions. Where 
it only made sense to litigate our exceptions 
-"#1#$0"#$&+11/-$'#%&(0(/&*$-#1#$*/?#"/-$
unclear – particularly in the presence of new 
technology – US fair use exceptions played a 
.1(0(.+=$1/=#$(&$>#1?(00(&)$?+F/1$(&&/,+0(/&*$/&$0"#$
internet in the United States – such as internet 
*#+1."$0#."&/=/)8$+&'$E>>=#3*$(7/'443  
Given this, even if legal costs rose on the 
(&01/'2.0(/&$/;$+$B#C(D=#$#C.#>0(/&$(&$E2*01+=(+L$
those costs would be dwarfed by the downstream 
D#&#%0*$0/$0"#$#./&/?8$#C>=/1#'$D#=/-4$
However, there are reasons to doubt that 
(&01/'2.(&)$+$B#C(D=#$#C.#>0(/&$-/2='$=#+'$0/$
higher legal costs. The US fair use doctrine has 
'#=(,#1#'$B#C(D(=(08$+&'$1//?$;/1$(&&/,+0(/&$-(0"$
relatively low rates of litigation (Beebe  2008).44 
42$!"(*$%)21#$'#1(,#*$;1/?$0"#$%)21#$2*#'$;1/?$0"#$\/2*#$/;$V#>1#*#&0+0(,#*$1#>/10$P2/0#'$+D/,#$+'F2*0#'$;/1$(&B+0(/&4
43$O210"#1$?/*0$%1?*$-(==$&/0$D#$>2*"(&)$0"#$D/2&'+1(#*$/;$+$B#C(D=#$#C.#>0(/&4$b/*0$-(==$*(?>=8$)+(&$)1#+0#1$*#.21(08$+1/2&'$+.0(,(0(#*$-"(."$.=#+1=8$%0$0"#$
fair use exception. Only leading edge innovators or large scale users (such as education) are likely to bear the legal costs of testing the fair use test.
44 Beebe, B. (2008) An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, I'&(#3*&52$)1$S#''*2"(,'&,$J,:$C#(&#:, 156(3).  
Available < http://www.bartonbeebe.com/documents/Beebe%20-%20Empirical%20Study%20of%20FU%20Opinions.pdf.>
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K8$./&01+*0$/21$/-&$?2."$?/1#$0()"0=8$'#%&#'$
fair dealing exceptions have relatively frequently 
been litigated. With rapid technological change, 
'#%&(&)$#C.#>0(/&*$-(0"$#C.#**(,#$*>#.(%.(08$
can increase uncertainty as stakeholders seek 
0/$'#0#1?(&#$-"#0"#1$*>#.(%.$#C.#>0(/&*$+>>=8$
to new technologies. 
:0$(*$&/0$'(;%.2=0$0/$0"(&R$/;$1#.#&0$.+*#*$(&$
copyright that concerned themselves largely 
-(0"$#(0"#1$0"#$%&#$'#0+(=*$/;$E2*01+=(+3*$*>#.(%.$
exceptions (e.g. Optus TV Now and the Panel 
case from 2005/06) or with conduct that could 
;+(1=8$1#+'(=8$D#$+''1#**#'$2&'#1$+$B#C(D=#$
exception (e.g. the generic pharmaceutical 
company sued for infringing copyright in 
TGA-approved product disclosure/information 
statements).45 As Weatherall and Hudson note:
In a rapidly changing technological 
environment, the search for certainty through 
*0#/&!/&52$=$54#$,55#+05$5)$6#!'#$#d/#05&)'*$
:&54&'$,'$&'/4$)1$54#&3$"&(#*$=$&*$6#*5&'#6$5)$
1,&"?$H#2)'6$,$/#35,&'$0)&'5>$*0#/&!/&52$"#,6*$
to more uncertainty for most stakeholders in 
the copyright system, because it is unclear 
:4#54#3$*0#/&!/$#d/#05&)'*$,00"2$5)$'#:$
technologies or analogous uses”.46
The Optus TV Now case provides another 
even more recent example with the case being 
reversed on appeal suggesting how unsettled 
the law is. 
5.2  Risk and investment
Perception of risk plays an important part in 
investment decisions of all kinds, and can be 
particularly important in start-up and early stage 
investment by entrepreneurs, angel and venture 
capital (VC) investors.
Recent studies by Booz & Co (2012a, 2012b), 
explore the impact of changes to copyright 
regulations on early stage investment in internet 
or digital content intermediaries (DCIs). Both 
reports explore the impacts of four scenarios: 
the ease of obtaining licensing agreements; 
the complexity in existing laws and related 
uncertainty; greater prosecution of end users in 
violation of copyright law; and holding websites 
liable for copyright infringement.
In essence, both reports look at the cost of 
1#'2.(&)$0"#$B#C(D(=(08$/;$#C.#>0(/&*$+&'$*+;#$
harbour provisions, and increasing uncertainty 
(i.e. the opposite of what is being examined in this 
report). Consequently, their evidence suggests 
proxy valuations for reducing risk and uncertainty, 
+&'$#C0#&'(&)$B#C(D=#$#C.#>0(/&*$+&'$*+;#$
harbour provisions for internet intermediaries.
Based on a survey of angel investors and 
interviews with venture capitalists, Booz & Co 
(2012a, 2012b) found that investors were highly 
averse to a regime that increases the costs 
of compliance or the uncertainty of the size 
of damages in the event of non-compliance. 
Moreover, changes in copyright regulations 
that would increase liability for either users or 
45 F,')!%8(#'5&*$87*53,"&,$S52$J56$($80)5#d$S52$J56 (No. 3) [2011] FCA 846. In this case the defendant manufactured a generic version of a drug that 
-+*$/20$/;$>+0#&0$+&'$1#>1/'2.#'$0"#$'(*.=/*21#c(&;/1?+0(/&$*0+0#?#&0*$;1/?$0"#$./?>+&8$0"+0$/1()(&+0#'$0"#$'12)$+&'$"+'$D##&$0"#$D#&#%.(+18$/;$
the (expired) patent . The copyright act has since been changed to allow such reproductions. It is highly likely that this issue would have been dealt 
with more simply under a fair use exception as the copying of the generic company could not conceivably have had an impact on any market for the 
copyright work.
46 Op Cit, p. 6.
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websites (hosts) would have a negative impact on 
investment. In summary:
! Eighty per cent of the US and 87% of the 
European angel investors surveyed said that 
they are uncomfortable investing in an area 
with an ambiguous regulatory framework.
! The pool of investors interested in investing in 
internet content intermediaries would increase 
by nearly 111% in the US and 19% in Europe 
(;$./>81()"0$1#)2=+0(/&*$-#1#$.=+1(%#'$0/$+==/-$
websites (e.g. hosts and ISPs) to resolve legal 
disputes quickly, thereby lowering their cost to 
comply with regulations. Limiting penalties for 
websites acting in good faith would increase 
the pool of interested investors by 115% in the 
US and 32% in Europe.
! Making it easier to hold users liable for 
uploading content without licenses would 
reduce the pool of interested investors by 
48% in the US and by 49% in Europe. In order 
to overcome their reluctance under such 
circumstances, investors would demand an 
expected return of an additional 12 times their 
original investment in the US and 7 times their 
original investment in Europe.
! Making it easier to hold websites (e.g. hosts 
and ISPs) themselves liable for unlicensed 
content uploaded by users (e.g. through 
limiting safe harbour provisions) created an 
81% decline in the pool of interested investors 
in the US and a 68% decline in Europe. In 
order to overcome their reluctance under 
such circumstances, investors would need an 
expected return of an additional 20 times their 
original investment in the US and 8 times their 
original investment in Europe.
! When angel investors were asked to choose 
an investment under a variety of conditions 
involving a range of investment factors, the 
results suggested that 47% of their investment 
decision is driven by the legal environments in 
the US and 38% in Europe.47 
While angel and venture capital (VC) 
investment may not be as large in Australia, it 
(*$*0(==$*()&(%.+&04$:&$@Y66L$iG$+&'$=+0#1$*0+)#$
private investment in Australia amounted to 
around $8.7 billion, of which almost $1.3 billion 
(15%) went into “IT, media, electronics and 
communications” activities.48 Angel investment 
was said to be around $500 million in 2007.49 
If IT, media, electronics and communications 
activities account for a similar proportion of angel 
investment as VC and later stage investment, 
then angel and VC investment in these activities 
in Australia is worth around $1.4 billion a year. 
We are unable to determine how much of this 
investment is focused on internet intermediary 
activities, or might be so focussed under a 
'(;;#1#&0$./>81()"0$1#)(?#4$\/-#,#1L$(;$F2*0$6YI$
of current angel and VC investment going into IT, 
media, electronics and communications activities 
were targeting internet content intermediaries, 
then following the Booz studies, investors 
would be looking at an average return worth 
around $407 million a year (i.e. 3x their original 
investment).50
47 Booz&Co. (2012a) The Impact of US Internet Copyright Regulations on Early-Stage Investment. Available < http://www.booz.com/media/uploads/
BoozCo-Impact-US-Internet-Copyright-Regulations-Early-Stage-Investment.pdf > and Booz&Co. (2012b) The Impact of EU Internet Copyright 
Regulations on Early-Stage Investment. Available < http://www.booz.com/media/uploads/BoozCo-Impact-EU-Internet-Copyright-Regulations-Early-
Stage-Investment.pdf >
48 ABS (2012) W#'573#$A,0&5,"$,'6$J,5#3$F5,.#$S3&(,5#$R;7&52>$87*53,"&,>$MNON%OO. Cat No 5678.0. 
49 < http://www.startup-australia.org/angel-investment >
50 According to estimates by the Kauffman Foundation, the average return on angel investments is roughly 3x. Cited in Booz&Co. (2012a) The Impact of 
US Internet Copyright Regulations on Early-Stage Investment. Available < http://www.booz.com/media/uploads/BoozCo-Impact-US-Internet-Copyright-
Regulations-Early-Stage-Investment.pdf >
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If making it easier to hold websites liable (e.g. 
by reducing exceptions and safe harbour 
protections) made them seek an additional 20 
times their original investment in the US and 8x 
in Europe, then:
! In the US, early stage investors are 
valuing the risks associated with reducing 
exceptions and safe harbours protections 
at the equivalent of $2.7 billion a year in 
Australia (i.e. an additional 20 times return 
on investment); and
! In Europe they are valuing that risk at the 
equivalent of $1.1 billion a year in Australia 
(i.e. an additional 8x return on investment).
Taking the average of US and European 
angel investor risk perceptions as 
indicative, investors are valuing reduced 
risk and uncertainty as a result of copyright 
limitations and exceptions at around  
$2 billion a year. 
Of course, risk perceptions vary and these 
%)21#*$+1#$&/$?/1#$0"+&$*2))#*0(,#$/;$0"#$
risk premium that might be associated with 
E2*01+=(+3*$(&B#C(D=#$#C.#>0(/&*L$2&.#10+(&08$+&'$
limited safe harbour protection in the minds of 
early stage investors. Indeed, the difference 
between the US and European samples 
suggests that the additional return sought in 
order to overcome their reluctance and return 
to such investments depend on availability of 
alternative investment candidates. 
It is clear from the annual reports of internet 
intermediaries that the complexity and uncertainty 
/;$./>81()"0L$+*$-#==$+*$'(;%.2=0(#*$+&'$#C>#&*#$
of centralised or atomised licensing are often 
cited among the risk factors facing business 
development and expansion. Pandora Media 
provides one example.51 The previously 
mentioned Akamai Technologies provides 
another. Under the standard heading of “Risk 
Factors” in US Securities and Exchange 
Commission annual reporting, the Akamai 
Technologies 2011 Annual Report says:
We may need to defend against patent or 
copyright infringement claims, which would 
cause us to incur substantial costs. 
Other companies or individuals, including our 
competitors, may hold or obtain patents or 
other proprietary rights that would prevent, 
limit or interfere with our ability to make, use 
or sell our services or develop new services, 
:4&/4$/)7"6$+,-#$&5$+)3#$6&1!/7"5$1)3$7*$5)$
increase revenues and improve or maintain 
03)!5,\&"&52?$A)+0,'&#*$4)"6&'.$@'5#3'#5%3#",5#6$
patents or other intellectual property rights are 
increasingly bringing suits alleging infringement 
of such rights against both technology providers 
,'6$/7*5)+#3*$54,5$7*#$*7/4$5#/4')").2?$8'2$
*7/4$,/5&)'$',+&'.$8-,+,&$/)7"6$\#$/)*5"2$5)$
defend or lead to an expensive settlement or 
judgment against us.
We have agreed to indemnify our customers 
&1$)73$*#3(&/#*$&'13&'.#$*0#/&!#6$&'5#""#/57,"$
property rights; therefore, we could become 
involved in litigation brought against customers 
if our services and technology are implicated. 
51 See, for example, Pandora Media < http://investor.pandora.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=227956&p=irol-stockQuote >. Indeed, typing < http://www.pandora.
com/ >$(&0/$8/21$D1/-*#1$(&$E2*01+=(+$0/$,(#-$7+&'/1+3*$+>/=/)8$0/$E2*01+=(+&*$;/1$&/0$D#(&)$+D=#$0/$*2>>=8$*#1,(.#*$0/$0"#?$(*$(&$(0*#=;$(&*012.0(,#4
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8'2$"&5&.,5&)'$)3$/",&+*>$:4#54#3$)3$')5$(,"&6>$
brought against us or pursuant to which 
we indemnify our customers could result in 
substantial costs and diversion of resources 
and require us to do one or more of the 
following:
e$ A#,*#$*#""&'.>$&'/)30)3,5&'.$)3$7*&'.$
products or services that incorporate the 
challenged intellectual property;
e$ S,2$*7\*5,'5&,"$6,+,.#*$,'6$&'/73$
*&.'&!/,'5$"&5&.,5&)'$#d0#'*#*f
e$ E\5,&'$,$"&/#'*#$13)+$54#$4)"6#3$)1$54#$
infringed intellectual property right, which 
license may not be available on reasonable 
terms or at all; or
e$ C#6#*&.'$03)67/5*$)3$*#3(&/#*?
If we are forced to take any of these actions, 
our business may be seriously harmed. In the 
event of a successful claim of infringement 
against us and our failure or inability to 
obtain a license to the infringed technology, 
our business and operating results could be 
materially adversely affected.^M 
This kind of statement is common (e.g. Apple 
Inc. makes a similar statement relating to its 
iTunes Store). Such statements have an effect on 
investor sentiment. 
The relative risks under different national 
regimes will also affect the locational decisions 
/;$#*0+D=(*"#'$%1?*L$-"/L$/0"#1$0"(&)*$#P2+=L$-(==$
favour lower risk locations, particularly where 
they are using innovative approaches.
5.3  Risk and innovation 
G(0(&)$0"#$Mj3*$XSN!EL$7-G$_@Y66]$./??#&0*$
on the “paucity of evidence linking IP 
(including copyright) and innovation”, though it 
+.R&/-=#')#*$0"+0$(0$"+*$+&$(&B2#&.#453 However, 
the impact on early stage investment (discussed 
above) is substantial, and there is extensive 
evidence of the contribution of angel and VC 
investment to innovation.
:&$+''(0(/&$0/$(&F#.0(&)$.+>(0+=L$+&)#=$(&,#*0/1*$
often play a hands-on role, providing 
entrepreneurs with mentoring, business advice 
and contacts. VCs also often play a hands-on 
role in the companies in which they invest. Given 
the key role that angels and VCs play, not only in 
funding new companies but also in working with 
them to promote their success, their continued 
willingness to invest is critical to the future 
creation and growth of new companies.54
  Among the relatively few studies exploring 
the relationship between VC investment and 
total factor productivity (TFP), the study by 
Bertoni et al (2010) found that VC investment 
"+'$+$D#&#%.(+=$#;;#.0$/&$%1?$=#,#=$!O7L$-(0"$
iGQD+.R#'$%1?*$1#,#+=(&)$"()"#1$!O7$0"+&$
&/&QD+.R#'$%1?*4$:&0#1#*0(&)=8L$0"#(1$=+1)#$*(CQ
country European sample included 492 internet 
%1?*L$+&'$/;$0"#$(&'2*018$)1/2>*$+&+=8*#'L$0"#$
difference between the TFP performance of 
iGQD+.R#'$+&'$&/&QD+.R#'$%1?*$-+*$)1#+0#*0$
+?/&)$(&0#1&#0$%1?*455  
52 Akamai Technologies (2012) 8''7,"$C#0)35$MNOO, pp15-16. Available < http://www.akamai.com/dl/investors/akamai_annual_report_11.pdf >
53 PwC (2011) 8'$#/)')+&/$,',"2*&*$)1$/)023&.45>$*#/)'6,32$/)023&.45$,'6$/)""#/5&(#$"&/#'*&'., PwC, pp. 24.
54 Booz&Co. (2012) The Impact of EU Internet Copyright Regulations on Early-Stage Investment. Available < http://www.booz.com/media/uploads/BoozCo-
Impact-EU-Internet-Copyright-Regulations-Early-Stage-Investment.pdf >
55$K#10/&(L$O4L$G/=/?D/L$b4J4L$^3E''+L$^4$+&'$b210(&2L$N4$_@Y6Y]$i#&021#$.+>(0+=$%&+&.(&)$+&'$(&&/,+0(/&$(&$S21/>#+&$X#-$!#."&/=/)8QK+*#'$O(1?*9$+$
longitudinal analysis on the role of the type of investor, CONCORD 2010. E,+(=+D=#$k$"00>9cc(1(4F1.4#.4#21/>+4#2c./&./1'Q@Y6Yc>+>#1*cD#10/&(l./=/?D/4>';$m
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6.  Investment and innovation 
! Apple: Established in 1977, Apple has 
evolved from a producer of computers into a 
leader in the consumer electronics industry. 
From the garage, Apple has grown into the 
=+1)#*0$0#."&/=/)8$%1?$(&$0"#$-/1='L$>/*0(&)$
annual revenues of USD 108 billion during 
@Y66L$+$)1/**$>1/%0$/;$+=?/*0$MN^$HH$D(==(/&$
and current market capitalisation of over 
USD 500 billion. In late 2011, Apple had 
approximately 60,400 full-time equivalent 
employees. One example of reliance on fair 
use is the Apple iPod. 57  
! Facebook: Facebook is a social 
networking service launched in February 
2004. As of April 2012, Facebook had 
more than 900 million active users. In 2011, 
O+.#D//R3*$1#,#&2#$-+*$MN^$n4Z$D(==(/&$
and it employed more than 3,000 people. 
O/==/-(&)$(03*$1#.#&0$:7W$O+.#D//R$(*$,+=2#'$
at over $60 billion.58 Facebook provides a 
platform for user generated content that 
relies on safe harbours and often fair use.
! Google: First incorporated as a privately 
held company in September 1998, its initial 
public offering was in August 2004. In 2011, 
Google posted annual revenue of USD 38 
billion, with a net income of almost USD 
10 billion. Current market capitalisation 
is USD 194 billion. Google employs 
over 30,000 people. Google has been 
estimated to process more than one billion 
search requests every day, and its search 
technology grew in reliance on fair use and 
safe harbours.
Investment and innovation exhibit ‘path 
'#>#&'#&.#34$G=2*0#1*$/;$+.0(,(08L$R&/-=#')#L$
entrepreneurial spirit and business practices 
develop over time, and such a cluster formed in 
one era can continue and grow into the next. 
Innovation and investment clusters develop as 
>#/>=#$-(0"$*>#.(%.$*R(==*$+&'$(&,#*0/1*$./?#$
0/)#0"#1$0/$?202+==8$D#&#%04$S&01#>1#&#21(+=$
clusters emerge, where it becomes the norm to 
apply knowledge and form a start-up venture. 
Investment can also develop around particular 
activities in a particular location.
The copyright regime is one of the framework 
conditions for investment and innovation. Its 
importance can depend on the nature of the 
activities and as outlined in this report, it is very 
important for internet intermediary activities. 
The US has become a hotbed for the 
development of the internet, including online 
*#1,(.#*4$E*$,/&$o/"?+&&$+1)2#*L$0"#$B#C(D(=(08$
of the fair use exception has operated as 
innovation policy within the copyright regime 
because it “creates incentives . . . to build 
innovative new products” and this “has yielded 
complementary technologies that enhance the 
value of copyrighted works”.56 
:0$(*$&/0+D=#$"/-$(?>/10+&0$0"#$MN3*$B#C(D=#$
copyright exception, fair use, has been in 
enabling many of the most pioneering and 
remunerative innovations of the age of ICT.  
For example:
56 Fred von Lohmann, 2008. “Fair Use as Innovation Policy”, Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Vol. 23:1.
57 Technologies to assist in legitimate online consumption of creative works like iPod and e-readers have paved the way for creators to receive higher 
proportion of sales as royalties than they receive elsewhere. See Knopper, Steve, 2001. “The New Economics of the Music Industry: How artists 
1#+==8$?+R#$?/&#8$(&$0"#$.=/2'$T$/1$'/&30aL$W.0/D#1$@d$+,+(=+D=#$+0$k$http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/the-new-economics-of-the-music-
industry-20111025#ixzz1y9RKsF5R >
58 < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Facebook_Inc >
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! Yahoo!: Yahoo! was incorporated in 1995. 
Its main web presence was initially as an 
/&=(&#$*#+1."$#&)(&#$D20$(0$'(,#1*(%#'$(&0/$
a web portal offering a variety of online 
services. In 2005 Yahoo! acquired Flickr for 
+&$#*0(?+0#'$gnd$?(==(/&4$e+"//p3*$1#,#&2#$;/1$
2011 was around $4.4 billion and it currently 
has a market capitalisation of around $19 
billion.59 Its services, including search, have 
evolved in an environment that includes fair 
use and safe harbours. 
In addition, these instances of reliance on fair 
use establish ground rules within which other 
business have felt comfortable operating, 
spurring further innovation and investment. 
In Australia, all these businesses may be 
exposed to increased risk of copyright violations 
were they to operate their services from here. 
E2*01+=(+$"+*$*/?#$'#%&(0#$*01#&)0"*$(&$0#1?*$
of attracting investment,60 and it is cutting 
off our nose to spite our face not to give our 
businesses a fair chance by making the domestic 
environment as conducive as possible to 
investment in pursuit of internet services. 
U(0"$&/$B#C(D=#$#C.#>0(/&$+&'$=(?(0#'$*+;#$
harbour protections there is substantially more 
legal risk to such services in Australia than in 
the US and in comparable countries seeking ICT 
investment in the region, such as Singapore. 
6.1  Productivity: Internet 
infrastructure as ‘general 
purpose’ investment 
!"#$(&0#1&#0$(*$+$<)#&#1+=$>21>/*#3$0#."&/=/)8$
investment like the internal combustion engine 
or electricity. It is the foundation for enhancing 
the productivity of large sectors of the economy. 
:;$'/?#*0(.$>1/'2.0(/&$(*$?/1#$#;%.(#&0$0"+&$
imports, disadvantaging local suppliers with an 
(&#;%.(#&0$=#)+=$1#)(?#$-(==$(?>/*#$+,/('+D=#$
costs on our economy and lower Australian  
living standards. 
Not only may imports cost more than local supply, 
but in many areas of internet infrastructure, 
imports provide lower service quality. Being 
supplied from further away, response times are 
slower as signals must pass to a computer on 
another continent and then back again. This 
can increase delay or latency from around 60 
milliseconds to around ten times that amount.
These losses can be expected to be dynamic 
because they degrade the quality of internet 
service available in Australia and they place 
Australian internet service providers and others 
that rely on them at a competitive disadvantage to 
providers elsewhere. 
Much of the explosion of productivity to which 
the internet has already given rise61 and which 
-(==$./&0(&2#$0/$D2(='L$(&,/=,#*$%&#1$+&'$%&#1$
divisions of labour. This process depends upon 
the openness of the internet, and thrives on 
the reduction of latency and its organisational 
equivalent – transactions costs. 
59 << http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yahoo! >>, << http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flickr http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/earnings/
earnings.asp?ticker=YHOO:US >>
60 < http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-04-19/high-tech-attracts-venture-capital/3959248?section=business > and see also Lateral Economics, 2011, 
94#$0)5#'5&,"$1)3$/")76$/)+075&'.$*#3(&/#*$&'$87*53,"&,, A study commissioned by the Macquarie Telecom at < http://www.lateraleconomics.com.au/
outputs/The%20potential%20for%20cloud%20computing%20services%20in%20Australia.pdf >
61 See Dolman, B., Parham, D. and Zheng, S. 2007, “Can Australia Match US Productivity Performance?”, Productivity Commission Staff Working 
Paper, Canberra.
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BOX 8:   
WHERE DOMESTIC INTERNET INVESTMENT BOOSTS 
DOWNSTREAM PRODUCTIVITY
Tele-surgery provides a clear example of an application that is highly intolerant of latency delays 
and so requires domestic investment. Tele-surgery brings surgical expertise to remote areas and 
underserved populations, helps healthcare providers make better use of expert surgeons, improves 
*21)(.+=$/20./?#*$+&'$1#'2.#*$./*0*4$\/-#,#1L$&#0-/1R$D+&'-('0"L$&#0-/1R$=+0#&.8$+&'$F(00#1$+1#$
obstacles to the widespread use of this technology. Of great importance to the success of tele-
surgery is the round-trip latency from the issuing of a robotic control signal to the resulting video 
'(*>=+8#'$+0$0"#$*21)#/&3*$*(0#4$!"(*$#**#&0(+==8$'#0#1?(&#*$0"#$*+;#08$/;$0#=#Q*21)#184$:;$0"#$1/D/0(.$
control signal gets delayed, it will result in a delayed action of the surgical robot. By contrast some 
other areas of medicine require high bandwidth but are not sensitive to latency – for instance 
remote and round the clock diagnosis of CAT scans, MRI and radiography.
b"F##O29.*-+=-./#61(:2'*-0-*=#
/9-.)#+1(;#3&4-5,&#
exceptions 
:0$(*$./&*#1,+0(,#$0/$+**2?#$0"+0$?/1#$B#C(D=#$
exceptions would lift the productivity growth 
rate of industries relying on limitations and 
exceptions to copyright by at least one one-
hundredth. We have used two methods to 
(==2*01+0#$0"#$)+(&*$?/1#$B#C(D=#$#C.#>0(/&*$
would provide. 
First we looked at Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS) data.  
! The ABS reports productivity data for 
16 sectors, including three that partially 
correspond to industries depending on 
limitations and exceptions (see Exceptional 
Industries the companion report to this 
one).  These are the information, media 
and telecommunications sector; arts and 
recreation services; and the professional, 
*.(#&0(%.$+&'$0#."&(.+=$*#1,(.#*$*#.0/14$
!$ !/)#0"#1$0"#*#$*#.0/1*3$(&'#C#*$/;$)1/**$
value added based multi-factor productivity 
(measuring their contribution to economic 
growth) increased by an average 1.2% 
a year between 2000 and 2010. This far 
exceeded overall growth which averaged 
F2*0$Y4YnI$+$8#+14$
!$ :;$>1/'2.0(,(08$)1/-0"$"+'$D##&$F2*0$/&#$
one-hundredth more, then at constant 
levels of input, industry value added would 
have been almost $837 million higher. It is 
important to note however that the ABS data 
+&'$"#&.#$0"(*$%)21#L$1#B#.0*$F2*0$+$>/10(/&$
(indeed less than 50 per cent) of the sectors 
that depend on limitations and exceptions as 
delinieated in Exceptional Industries. 
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E
xcepting the F
uture
Second we used the data from Exceptional 
Industries.
! We simulated a scenario in which the 
industries relying on limitations and 
exceptions as delinieated in Exceptional 
Industries$#C>#1(#&.#'$)1/-0"$0"+0$-+*$F2*0$
one-hundredth more than the rate of growth 
they experienced in the three years from 
2007 through 2010. 
! Had this occurred this would have 
generated:
– a $227 million increase in industry 
income; and
– a $138 million increase in aggregate 
industry value added which, given that  
it has been funded by productivity 
growth, is a net gain to Australian 
economic wellbeing.
! This additional growth would compound 
through time so that after ten years the 
income of the limitations and exceptions 
industries would be $1.2 billion higher, 
and value added or the welfare gain to the 
Australian economy would be $593 million 
higher. The cumulative additional value to 
the Australian economy would be $3 billion. 
This productivity growth is attributable to 
>1/,('(&)$B#C(D=#$#C.#>0(/&*$+&'$?/1#$./2='$
be seen by extending the safe harbours to the 
activities of internet intermediaries. 
U(0"$B#C(D=#$#C.#>0(/&*$+&'$#C0#&*(/&$/;$*+;#$
harbours, Australia is more likely to attract 
investment (including infrastructure such as 
data centres) and promote innovation than 
under the current regime, and at negligible 
cost (indeed most probably with gains) to 
copyright content production in Australia. As 
*2."L$0"#$#./&/?(.$.+*#$;/1$?/1#$B#C(D=#$
exceptions is made. 
f%&.#'(;5-.&:#>-*%#*%&#>-:&1#5&.&8*)@#
there is every reason to Except the Future.
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